tion of the Crown and the people, it has been decided that there shall be no session of a new parliament during certain months in the year or for a given period of time, this would be an unlawful or improper infringement upon the prerogative, especially by a body that has a right to alter or amend the constitution.

But does the Algoma proviso really prejudice the prerogative? We have seen that it has not done so in the past, nor is likely to do so. The case is supposed of a political crisis, say in the Fall, necessitating a dissolution. The Legislature might, it is suggested, refuse to vote supplies, and no appeal to a new House could be had until the July following at the earliest. Is the Crown to be thus deprived of the means for carrying on the government for some seven or eight months? The answer is that, while the Crown would have the right to dissolve, harmony between the Crown and the Legislature could be secured by a change of Ministers. The prerogative is not an arbitrary instrument, but one always to be used judiciously and solely in the public interest. A Governor may have to decide between a change of Ministers and a stoppage of the Queen's business. In that case he must act on his best judgment. Supposing, however, by forcing him to accept, as the result of an appeal to the country, the will of a partially constituted House only, and Ministers in whom a majority of the country, if represented by a complete House, would have no confidence, what would then become of the rights of the Crown? It might get supplies, it is true, but at the price of the prerogative.

THE ARGUMENT OF CONVENIENCE.

In the foregoing remarks the question of convenience has been incidentally referred to. It is argued that the inconvenience of the arrangement which limits elections in Algoma to certain months in the year, is to have great weight in considering the intentions of the Legislature, when framing the Statute. Mr. Scott, M.P.P., in his argument, quoted from 'Maxwell's Interpretation of the Statutes,' in support of this view. Maxwell, in his 'Interpretation of the Statutes,' page 166, says 'An argument drawn from an inconvenience, it has been said, is forcible in law, and no less force is due to any drawn from an absurdity or injustice.' But 'inconvenience' alone is not sufficient to invalidate a Statute that is clear and unmistakable in its terms. The law books are full of decisions, some of which are to be found in 'Maxwell' (p. 5), distinctly insisting on adherence to the express letter of the Statute, no matter what the consequences, or, in other words, the 'inconvenience' may be. In 'Maxwell' p. 4, occurs the following passage: 'If the words go beyond what was the intention, effect must nevertheless be given to them. They cannot be construed contrary to their meaning merely because no good reason appears why they should be excluded or embraced. However unjust, arbitrary or inconvenient the intention may be, it must receive its full effect. When once the intention is plain, it is not the province of a court to scan its wisdom or its policy.' The plea of inconvenience in the present instance has no practical weight. A possible difficulty can only arise at a General Election. The practice of Ontario is against the presumption that such an inconvenience will arise. It was for the Legislature in framing the Election Law to balance inconveniences. They decided, it must be assumed, that it would be less inconvenient, perhaps once in a great many years, for public business to have to await the election of a complete Assembly than to recognise as a valid and effectual meeting of Parliament one from which a portion of the representation was, per force, excluded. However to guard against a most improbable eventuality it has now been