

European NATO targets, in relatively little time — perhaps fifteen minutes.

The deployment of Soviet submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles under the edges of the polar ice pack, may be in fact one of the most destabilizing of all foreseeable technological advances in strategic weaponry (if only because they might be used in a counterforce first strike). As Dr. Critchley concluded: "In the interests of maintaining Canadian sovereignty, it is essential for Canada to participate in the development and application of monitoring techniques for these waters. Yet . . . I have found no evidence of any effective monitoring mechanisms in place — or planned — in these areas." This is one instance where Canadian territory can become unintentionally involved as an important element of new superpower activities in the nuclear arms race.

### Star Wars North

Another example of an issue that may change the future for us, as a witness of the Soviet-American strategic interaction, is the SDI or "Strategic Defence Initiative" proposed by President Reagan in March 1983. Although the Canadian government has officially declined to participate in this research program, the momentum of the SDI will inevitably put pressure on Ottawa to make further policy decisions regarding North American aerospace defence. Admittedly, the evaluation and conclusions about the Reagan administration's proposal are speculative because no one knows for sure how this mega-Manhattan project will turn out. At this point, however, it is difficult to see how the SDI can improve the military or political condition of the nuclear deterrence world. A space-based defence, in the view of many experts, will just be another giant step in the arms race and not a deactivating factor in the US-Soviet military competition. More importantly for us, such a defence system might involve Canadian territory once again. In a press interview on February 5, 1985, as reported by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament *Arms Control Chronicle* of Spring 1985, the chief of the Department of National Defence research and analysis establishment acknowledged the possibility of ballistic missile defence launchers being based on Canadian territory, both for mid-course interception and for the terminal defence of potential targets in Canada.

This is another instance where we could become entangled with a superpower action, albeit this time a supposedly defensive one. One implication of the SDI might be to make the northern Canadian territory in the long run a critical and valuable strategic area, tailored just right for setting up anti-ballistic missiles or ground-based laser stations. A second serious implication of the Strategic Defence Initiative would be Canadian participation in the new space command of NORAD (established by the Pentagon this fall), that would directly involve us with the command, control and communication systems required for the conduct of space defence operations and for other forms of Soviet missile interception. Another implication of the SDI is that Canada might be in a difficult position if the divergence of interest between our Western European allies and the United States increased, with respect to the soundness of proceeding forward with Star Wars type of defence. The old bogey of a decoupling of NATO security from the

American nuclear protection would surely reappear as an explosive matter of contention, if and when the US were seen in Europe as constructing for itself, and only for itself, an impermeable defensive fortress. Canada could eventually find itself in the awkward situation where it faced two distinct approaches toward the nuclear issue, one European and the other American; one advocating the retention of the superpower Mutual Assured Destruction concept, the other arguing in favor of a shift by the United States and the Soviet Union to the notion of Mutual Assured Survival. Canada in this case might have to decide which approach it wanted to encourage, especially if a growing public debate about the SDI in this country required a clearer statement of policy intention on the part of the government.

### Limited influence of Canada

The two strategic trends described here — one, the Soviet deployment of a new generation of nuclear submarines and launchers capable of operating in Canadian Arctic waters, and the other, the American quest for a full-scope or partial nuclear protection — clearly present new security problems for Canada. They are problems especially because few experts in this country think that they will promote stability in the nuclear world. Also, the persistent issue of Canadian sovereignty relating to those matters could likely be aggravated, as public awareness of Canada's inability to influence external factors which affect its security becomes widespread.

What then can Canada do? Not much, unfortunately, at least not much directly. We have traditionally been viewed as a "middle-power," that is, Canadian contributions to international relations were seen to involve special responsibility for such functions as peacekeeping, mediating and communicating. Middle-power internationalism was for a long time the expression of Canadian foreign policy, epitomized in Canada's commitment to peacekeeping operations, from Kashmir to Palestine, from the Sinai to Cyprus. But the ability of Canada to help solve international security problems has been met with increasing skepticism. First, there is an international consensus that the Canadian military forces are under-equipped and lack a clear mandate to fulfill the basic missions related to our territorial defence (recall the recent episode of the *Polar Sea*). Second, while Canada has done relatively well as a partner with other countries in peacekeeping activities or in gathering support for signing international treaties, the future does not appear promising for our influence to have a significant impact in either of those areas. And third, as a mediator between states or groups of states, as a regional or global "fixer," Canada has more often than not experienced frustration in trying to advance the cause of peace. Of course all of this results from our geopolitical rank and status within the international system. Only the superpowers can really do something about nuclear weapons. However this does not mean that our efforts are and must be totally useless when it comes to helping the world become a safer place.

### No hope for peace plans

In particular, it is fallacious to believe that if we were daring enough to take a global initiative on our own to try to lessen the threat of nuclear war, things might change. As