

*Committee on Railways and Shipping*

when according to my figures it was something over 14 hours, and also when they fail to make any reference to the time he had been on duty during the five days immediately preceding the day that the crash took place.

I suggest, Mr. Speaker, to this board of doctors, to the members of the technical board of inquiry, to the Minister of Transport and to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, that they arrange to take a series of trips of that kind. Let them go without any responsibility on their minds. They could take along *Hansard* and read that if they wished. They should just sit on the plane and fly from Montreal to Bermuda and back on Sunday; Montreal to Florida and back on Monday and Wednesday and Friday, making sure of course that the flights are delayed so that they do not get home Monday night until 4.30 and Wednesday night until 2.00 a.m. I suggest that at the end of that period, without having any responsibility, they will admit that they are fatigued. What about the pilot, under such circumstances, bearing in mind his constant sense of responsibility? I submit that any ordinary layman would recognize there must have been some element of fatigue after a work cycle of that kind.

Now, as is obvious, I had a good deal ready to deal with in connection with this matter, but in view of the argument we had over procedure until the Minister of Trade and Commerce rescued me I have had to cut out a good deal of it. I want to point out also that in my view some of the questioning by this board was not the kind that I think should be accepted as the end of the story. For example, on page 209 of the transcript of evidence, after Captain Ramsay has been questioned for 71 pages on technical matters, I find that he is questioned in these terms:

Q. Do you consider that this accident was caused then by failure, say, of the human element?

A. I do not believe there was anything mechanical involved.

Q. You can give us no suggestion which might explain the failure of the human element?

Even before the man admits it, it is thrown back at him.

A. No, I cannot actually.

Q. Do you believe yourself that this was a failure of the human element?

A. Well, to the best of my knowledge there was no instrumentation failure or any mechanical failure of the aircraft. At the same time—

At this point the evidence is broken off with a dash which indicates that the questioner cut in on the witness with this:

Q. This is the only other alternative then, or do you visualize any other alternative that would explain this accident?

A. I cannot.

[Mr. Knowles.]

Q. Are there any circumstances at all that you are aware of which would increase the possibility of human element failure on this particular approach?

A. I don't just quite understand that, what you mean by that.

Q. Well, was there any stress that you were under in any way—you or any other member of your flight crew?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. The human element fails in general when it is overstressed. There is usually, I believe, some explanation why the human element fails. Did you feel on this approach that you were overloaded? Were you under stress during the approach?

A. No, I didn't. To the best of my knowledge it was, you might say, just another let-down.

Q. You had no apprehensions yourself?

A. Not knowingly.

Then, there is some reference to a written statement which the captain had prepared which was to be accepted to be included in the evidence. Similarly, Mr. Speaker, over on page 291 there is a series of questions which were put to Miss Deruchie, the stewardess, about the flight. As I read these questions they seem to me to be, like the questions I just quoted which were put to Captain Ramsay, what are called leading questions. Up to this point all the questions had been with regard to flight matters, technical matters, and then all of a sudden comes this form of questioning which is more or less an assertion to the witness that it must have been the human element if no equipment is found to be at fault. Listen to this questioning of the stewardess:

Q. Perhaps one final question. If it can be established that all equipment was functioning normally and that there was nothing wrong with any instrument or altimeter, the cause of the accident then immediately becomes personal, human error on the part of the flight crew. This being the case, in order to help your flight crew, anything that you can say that might explain why they failed would be of enormous value both to them and to this board of inquiry and to aviation in general.

A. I know of nothing unless the captain had an attack of something, the same as the first officer and myself had.

Q. Nothing whatever in his appearance during the whole of this day would lead you to feel he was unwell or tired or under any strain or worrying about anything?

A. Oh, no, he's always a very gay boy. We had our meal together in the coffee shop and he looked around the souvenir counters. No, nothing abnormal there.

The Chairman: Q. I have one question. Your statement that you felt it must have been instrument trouble, that is a deduction you have arrived at since the crash?

A. Well, having looked—all I can remember is being so surprised because, as I say, I thought we were at 2,000 feet, and I'm—

Here again there is the dash which means the witness is cut off.

Q. Would you answer my question? It's a deduction you have arrived at since the crash?

A. Oh, yes.

—(Witness withdrawn.)