

it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states, especially to those who now have the capacity to produce nuclear arms, or soon will have that capacity.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation to other states pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement — the Non-Proliferation Treaty — came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstruck. The treaty stands now at a crossroads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries — East and West, North and South — preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "two-track" decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

So I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other — laminated together, as they are in real life: an increasing resort to the use of force; the growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and a superpower relationship charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists — locked in rivalry or combat — begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.