

although most of its personnel continue in normal civilian jobs. The reservists live in the vicinity of their unit assembly points. Each man has his mobilization assignment. He knows exactly where to go to draw his individual equipment and just where to take his place in a gun squad, tank crew, or rifle platoon. It is the place he has already been trained to fill. Long-term officers and technicians maintain the equipment and the units have periodic training exercises.

A division of this type, which can be mobilized in twenty-four to seventy-two hours, is almost as ready for action as is the front-line division maintained at full strength. Some reserve divisions will not be ready that quickly. They will require a little more time for unit training. But in every case, a reserve division must have most of the major equipment available, as well as a reservoir of trained combat soldiers and specialists."

So much for our programme for 1952, which I submit is now reasonably clear in our minds. As for the subsequent years, figures were talked about at Lisbon which have not been made public. These were, as I have said, for planning purposes only. We agreed at Lisbon that they should be reviewed periodically by NATO agencies to make sure that they were realistic in the light of prevailing conditions; that if they could be safely reduced they would be; and that if they had to be increased recognition could be given to that fact. For that purpose we resolved at Lisbon that an appropriate NATO agency, not an ad hoc committee but an appropriate permanent agency of NATO--perhaps part of the Secretariat, but that is to be worked out--should continuously review the requirements for building adequate defensive strength, and try to reconcile the military needs of the countries concerned with their political and economic capabilities. Surely that does not look as though the military are running away with our planning in NATO, or as though NATO has fallen completely under their control or under any sinister influence of any kind. That is all I want to say about that aspect of our work at Lisbon.

The second subject we discussed there, and a very important matter indeed, was the association of Germany with Western defence. When we got to Lisbon, the atmosphere with respect to this matter was not very propitious. There had been difficulties in some of the European capitals, where the legislatures had been discussing these questions, and no one felt unduly optimistic that we would be able to reach agreed decisions at Lisbon with respect to this matter of German association with Western defence. In fact, we were successful in reaching such agreed decisions. One resolution approved on behalf of NATO of the principles of the treaty establishing a European Defence Community, which treaty included provision for a German defence contribution, and also provisions for certain security regulations after the peace contract takes the place of the occupation statute. We also agreed at Lisbon on principles governing the relationship between the European Defence Community, if and when it comes into being, and NATO itself. Our decision here was to this effect. We agreed that there should be two closely related organizations, one working--as far as the common objective of the defence of the Atlantic area was concerned--within the framework of and reinforcing the other.