

new commitments might tend to strain their military resources and complicate their political relations with other nuclear powers as well as with rivals of countries to whom a guarantee was extended. While the great powers might be prepared to accept responsibilities commensurate with their status, there are, of course, limits to the responsibilities they can be expected to undertake.

U.S. AND SOVIET PROPOSALS

Attention has been given recently to this question of providing the non-aligned countries with adequate assurances about security, which, at the same time, might help to dissuade them from developing their own nuclear weapons. President Johnson made a constructive contribution when he declared in 1964 that "nations not following the nuclear path will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail". At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. delegates suggested that such assurances might take the form of an Assembly resolution.

More recently, Chairman Kosygin has proposed a type of indirect assurance under which the nuclear powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. While this proposal may have certain attractions, we must recognize a difficulty in establishing as a fact whether nuclear weapons are present in certain areas. Furthermore, the additional security offered by this suggestion will be measured against its possible disruptive effect on the collective-security aspects of alliances.

Non-aligned countries, however, faced by a credible nuclear threat, may wish to enter into some form of collective-security agreement with all the nuclear powers, or, if this proves impracticable, into arrangements with individual nations on an ad hoc basis.

A United Nations resolution signifying the intention of members to provide or support assistance to non-nuclear states subject to nuclear attack, or threats of attack, might also provide a form of useful collective assurance in no way incompatible with other and more direct arrangements.

QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDS

Mention should be made of another difficult question, that of safeguards. Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made in elaborating the conception and in developing the practical application of the means of preventing nuclear materials which are supplied for peaceful use from being diverted to the manufacture of weapons. As a major uranium exporter, committed to supplying nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes, Canada is much encouraged to see the acceptance of international safeguards steadily gaining ground, either under the efficient system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency or through equivalent arrange-

ments of an organization such as EURATOM. In the common effort to contain the nuclear threat, we regard safeguards as one of the important instruments which the international community has at its disposal.

Canada has participated actively in the working out of the IAEA safeguards system. Only this week we demonstrated again our support for and confidence in that system, in respect to our agreement with Japan for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We signed an agreement in Vienna under which the International Atomic Energy Agency assumes the responsibility for administering the safeguards incorporated in the Canada-Japan Agreement.

If a non-proliferation treaty is to be effective, to inspire confidence, and to endure, it will require some means of verifying that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are being carried out. This should include a provision to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities and materials for them are not being used clandestinely for military purposes.

But, if safeguards are to be acceptable and effective, they must be acceptable and applicable to all states. These recognized systems of safeguards which are already applied by many countries to transactions involving transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes should be applied to cover all such international transfers. In this way, an important step forward would be taken to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by additional countries. We in Canada support the inclusion in any treaty of a provision designed to achieve this objective....

CHINA MUST BE INCLUDED

I have already mentioned the emergence of China as a nuclear power and as a new factor in the nuclear equation. The Chinese leaders appear bent on achieving an effective military nuclear capability however long it takes and however much it costs. To those seeking a peaceful world order, this prospect can only be viewed with deep concern. So long as China remains outside existing international councils, isolating itself from the influence of other governments and world opinion, it is the more likely to remain a recalcitrant and disturbing factor in the world balance of power.

Yet it seems clear that progress towards the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective measures of arms control require that all the principal world powers - including continental China - must be party to international discussions of these questions. Therefore, we should do everything possible to bring China into discussions about disarmament and other great international issues. This may make it more conscious of its responsibility as a member of the international community. In this endeavour, those who already have direct contact with Peking have a special and important role to play....

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