

Men, being naturally selfish, or endow'd only with a confin'd generosity, they are not easily induc'd to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance. Now as it frequently happens, that these mutual performances cannot be finish'd at the same instant, 'tis necessary, that one party be contented to remain in uncertainty, and depend upon the gratitude of the other for a return of kindness. But so much corruption is there among men, that, generally speaking, this becomes a slender security; and as the benefactor is here suppos'd to bestow his favours with a view to self-interest, this both takes off from the obligation and sets an example of selfishness, which is the true mother of ingratitude. Were we, therefore, to follow the natural course of our passions and inclinations, we shou'd perform few actions for the advantage of others, from disinterested views; because we are naturally very limited in our kindness and affection.

David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (1960, 519)

A society such as Hume describes would be a harsh place. It would resemble the Italian village of Montegrano that Edward Banfield (1958, 110) described in the 1950s: "...any advantage that may be given to another is necessarily at the expense of one's own family. Therefore, one cannot afford the luxury of charity, which is giving others more than their due, or even justice, which is giving them their due." Montegrano is a mean world, where daily life is "brutal and senseless" (Banfield, 1958, 109), much like Hobbes's "nasty, brutish, and short" existence. All who stand outside the immediate family are "potential enemies," battling for the meager bounty that nature has provided. People seek to protect themselves from the "threat of calamity" (Banfield, 1958, 110).

We aren't all Montegranans. Most people make promises and honor them. They don't lie consistently or steal at all. Few even cheat government (or admit to it). Why? We usually don't get burned when we trust each other. Our world doesn't look quite so bleak, so we can afford to take the risks that trusting others entails. But trusting others is more than a rational gamble. It is also a moral decision, stemming from deeply-held values that go beyond direct experience.

I shall show how both expectations of reciprocity and values contribute to our intentions to behave morally, using data from the 1981 World Values Study (WVS) in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The WVS is a multi-nation survey that asks identical questions in each country. I focus on questions about moral behavior: Is it ever acceptable to lie, to cheat on taxes, to claim benefits you are not entitled to, and the like? What shapes peoples' attitudes toward moral behavior? I posit that trust in other people, together with personal moral codes, religious values, expectations of others' sense of morality, and ties to one's community all contribute to beliefs about morality. And I believe that your perceptions of how others behave are *not as critical* as your own moral code, your trust in others, and religious values.

But we should not expect the same patterns in each of the three Anglo-Americans democracies. Expectations of reciprocity should--and do--count most in individualistic political cultures, most notably the United States. Core values should--and do--matter everywhere. They take on particular importance in Britain and Canada, where reciprocity