

would revolt. The Confederacy was disappointed in its hope: the solidarity of the mill hands with the anti-slavery Union government was a formative influence on the thinking of Karl Marx.⁶ The strategic idea of coercion by denial of supply, however, survived nonetheless. This may have been because the Union employed economic blockade against the Confederacy. One of the officers who served in the United States Navy's blockade squadrons was Alfred Thayer Mahan who became the great apologist for "seapower" which he saw primarily as the capacity of navies to control trade.⁷ Following the Civil War the *Jeune Ecole* of the French Navy developed a plan to use that strategy against Britain.⁸

The idea of the League of Nations Union in 1918 was that the political mechanism of economic sanctions would be a product of their capacity to convey to the people of the target state the disapproval of the world. It was expected that an aroused public would compel their government to bow to the demand of the world community. This mechanism of coercion was referred to by Judge William Webster, the Director of the American Central Intelligence Agency, in his brief to the United States Senate on 7 December 1990 about the sanctions which had been imposed on Iraq by the United Nations following the invasion of Kuwait. He said that "economic sanctions and the embargo against Iraq have put Saddam Hussein on notice that he is isolated from the world community."⁹

If the disapprobation of the international community does not mobilize the people of the target state into compelling their government to change its policies, economic sanctions must depend for its coercive force upon persuading the political leadership that it must make concessions to avert economic catastrophe, for themselves personally if not for their country. Ideally, economic warfare as a means of coercion should be carefully focused on those people within a state who have the capacity to influence policy. This ideal calls for a degree of sophistication which in practice is elusive.

⁶ F.L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, (Chicago, 1969), pp. 1-50, 134-42; and Philip S. Foner, *British Labour and The American Civil War*, (New York, 1981), pp. 4-5, 11-24 *et passim*..

⁷ "Incidents of War and Blockade Service", in Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, (New York, 1968), pp. 156-95.

⁸ Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnaught Era, 1880-1905*, (Hamden, Conn., 1964) pp. 86-91 *et. seq.*

⁹ Report for the 101st Congress, Friday December 7, 1990 5:40 EST.