of those weapons systems most relevant to surprise attack and offensive action (main battle tanks to 40,000; artillery to 33,000; armoured troop carriers to 56,000); a limit on the amounts of these armaments which can be held by any one country (no more than 30 percent of the overall limits); and additional limits on armaments stationed outside a country's national territory in active units (main battle tanks 3,200; artillery 1,700; armoured troop carriers 6,000). We have also proposed an annual exchange of information regarding military holdings and troop levels, and have underlined the need for stabilizing measures and rigorous verification arrangements.

In the Negotiations on Confidence- and

Security-Building Measures (CSBM), Mr. Clark explained we seek to build upon the successful implementation of the Stockholm Document on CSBM in Europe by creating greater transparency about military organization, as well as military activity. To achieve this, we have proposed: an annual exchange of information concerning military organization, manpower, equipment and major weapons deployment programmes, subject to a system of random evaluation; greater information exchange on military activities: improvements to observation/inspection modalities; the lowering of thresholds for observation and for longer notice of larger scale activities; as well as measures designed to improve contacts and communication. To

enhance the free exchange of ideas and further reduce misunderstandings, we have also proposed the holding of a seminar among all 35 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating states on military doctrine.

Mr. Clark noted that the proposals put forward by Canada and its Allies in Vienna enjoy the advantage of being realistic. They involve reasonable steps which, if implemented, could result in a new architecture for security, upon which to build a more stable Europe. It is our hope, Mr. Clark added, that these proposals will be received in the spirit of cooperation in which they have been put forward.

West States Position at Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The following is the position paper recently provided by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States at the commencement of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Objectives

- 1. The objectives of these negotiations as agreed in the mandate, are:
- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security;
- the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating largescale offensive action.
- 2. Through the approach outlined below, the Western Delegations will seek to establish a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible options. We pursue this aim on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all. Our approach offers a coherent whole and is intended to be applied simultaneously and in its totality in the area of application.

Rationale

- 3. The rationale for our approach is as follows:
- the present concentration of forces in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals is the highest ever known in peacetime and represents the greatest destructive potential ever assembled. Overall levels of forces, particularly those relevant to surprise attack and offensive action such as tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, must, therefore, be radically reduced. It is the substantial disparity in the numbers of these systems, all capable of rapid mobility and high firepower, which most threatens stability in Europe. These systems are also central to the seizing and holding of territory, the prime aim of any aggressor;
- no one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms: no participant should, therefore, possess more than a fixed proportion of the total holdings of all participants in each category of armaments, commensurate with its needs for self defence;
- addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will not by itself affect the stationing of armaments outside national borders: additional limits will also be needed on forces stationed on other countries' territory;

- we need to focus on both the levels of armaments and state of readiness of forces in those areas where the concentration of such forces is greatest, as well as to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another. It will, therefore, be necessary to apply a series of interlocking sub-limits covering forces throughout the area, together with further limits on armaments in active units.
- 4. The following specific measures within the area of application would fulfil these objectives:

Rule 1: Overall Limit

The overall total of weapons in each of the three categories identified above will at no time exceed:

- main battle tanks 40,000
- artillery pieces 33,000
- armoured troop
 - carriers 56,000

Rule 2: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30 percent of the overall limits in these three categories, that is,

- main battle tanks 12,000
- artillery pieces 10,000
- armoured troop
 - carriers 16,800