

of beauty and of the laws which govern art as well as the nature of art itself. Hardly can this now be said, for although is still wanting knowledge of the intrinsic value of art, its technical qualities and the laws which govern them are swiftly becoming recognized and consistently followed.

It will, therefore, in no wise be necessary to declaim violently against the old-time (yet was it so very old?) barbarities; they are dead. Only to suggest what seem now to be steps toward a truer state of affairs, to note what seem now to be possible laws touching the application of beauty. What the essential nature of beauty is we do not know, and it would be futile to ask. We do know, however, that it is something fixed; that there is accounting for tastes, distinctly. That one man's judgment touching what is beautiful is *not* as good as another's. This thing we have had to accept, although unwillingly: it was borne in upon us with a directness of power there was no gainsaying. We know now that Greek and thirteenth to sixteenth century Gothic art are good, and that Roman, Pompeian and Renaissance art are truly not art, but bad. Now, until we have sufficient knowledge to establish a permanent criterion

for the judgment of all that which lays claim to the name of art, until we know the secret of beauty and the intrinsic meaning of art, we must be content, accepting pure Greek and Gothic as the noblest art thus far, to bring all things to them, judging them so, calling that good which violates none of the inferred canons of the art of these two ages, and calling that distinctly bad which is related in any way to the corrupt art of Rome and the Renaissance. It is the custom to consider Greek and Gothic art as opposed violently to each other, but the inference is wholly superficial and false. The two arts hold precisely the same relation to each other as do Beethoven and Wagner. It is only the superficial who find an antagonism between them. The subject is of peculiar interest, but bears not at all on the question in hand, and, therefore, claiming now no attention.

In this way, then, must we judge of beauty itself. The first law governing the application of beauty to decoration has already been expressed; that the house must be the man, unequivocally; his personality entering into it and giving it life.—RALPH A. CRAM, in the *Decorator and Furnisher*.

SUGGESTIONS ON PUBLIC HEALTH NOMENCLATURE.

DR. Ezra M. Hunt, secretary of the State Board of Health of New Jersey, at the Meeting, in December last, at Washington, of the American Public Health Association, read an interesting paper on the above-named subject, of which the following is an abstract:

So much misconception comes from a loose or indefinite use of terms that we cannot be too careful to have classifications which shall have right foundations and be well understood. No two persons can discuss a subject of medical or sanitary science or art without they use technical terms in the same sense, or without the one knows in what sense the other uses them. The need of this exactness in a new science or a new art is especially manifest. The word hygiene has a variety of spelling justified by the dictionaries that could not have occurred had its derivation from the Greek "ἱγίαινω," "I am in good health," been kept in view.

This alone should determine the spelling hygiene in preference to the form hygieine and hygeine, both of which have been in common use. . . .

Hygiology is a good word, as used by Dr. Farr, to denote that science of which hygiene is the art. Hygiology (Farr's 5th. Rep't) is the science of hygiene.

Our next word, sanitary, also has a good derivation from the Latin *Sanis*. As to it, we find that in the first reports of the Registrar-General of England the word was uniformly spelled *sanitary*. Its changed spelling is probably made in order to conform to the usual terminology of such words in our language.

Besides the words hygiene, hygiology, sanitary, and sanitation, there was an early tendency to speak of sanitary medicine and of state medicine.

Although if we could use the term "medicine" in what Professor de Chaulmont claims to be its derivative sense—