

number of departments. Further steps are being taken at the present time. We've committed funds to enable Canada to become a member of the international seismic-data exchange, an international verification mechanism being developed in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In a few months Canada will be joining those countries already exchanging data on a provisional basis. We've called for the early implementation of the exchange in advance of a treaty.

Within our research and public information program, established after UNSSOD I and substantially increased in size this year, we intend to put special emphasis in the coming year on research projects related to verification by Canadian universities, institutes and individuals.

We will also institutionalize an expanding Canadian role in verification issues in order to utilize effectively expertise in several government departments and in the private sector in the negotiation of agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons systems. I'm referring in particular to expertise in seismology, nuclear safeguards, remote sensing, toxicology and protective measures against chemical weapons, and communication satellites.

**Attention to
horizontal
proliferation**

There's a third subject which deserves the attention of the Pugwash Movement in the years ahead. It's horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. At UNSSOD II member states including Canada quite rightly concentrated on vertical proliferation. But Canada, as a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has always insisted that the two can't be separated in reality. Thus Canadian priorities in arms control and disarmament include the promotion of the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the NPT.

Canada's non-proliferation policy as it's applied to nuclear exports is intended to inhibit the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. Our two-tiered approach to the safeguarding of nuclear exports provides a strong lead to the rest of the world.

In the first instance, we require that prospective nuclear partners, if they are non-nuclear weapons states, be parties to the NPT or have made equivalent commitments, including "fullscope" safeguards. Second, countries must enter into a bilateral nuclear co-operation agreement with Canada which incorporates, *inter alia*, the provision of "fallback" safeguards. These two requirements combine in a comprehensive, systematic manner and form the foundation of Canadian nuclear export policy, which is applied without discrimination, and under which proliferation can't occur unless treaty obligations are broken.

Canada's commitment to the use and diffusion of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes continues. Indeed, in the context of a broad Canadian effort to redouble its assistance to developing countries, Canada has recently signed or negotiated nuclear