

I am concerned is very irrelevant in the conflict in Aceh, which really results from much of the human right abuses and the military policies of the 1980s, if you think of where broad support in Aceh for the Free Aceh Movement or for the referendum on Aceh's independence comes from. There were repeated promises that were made in Indonesia toward Aceh that were subsequently withdrawn. You see this throughout Indonesia's history. This continues to be a main source of distrust among the Acehnese toward the Indonesian state. "Special autonomy," for instance, the most recent package offered to Aceh, loses almost all of its ability to bring widespread support – and this was a very good package for Aceh - because of the parallel military operations that have been operating now for over a year. A continued military solution to resolve the problem only makes things worse. And we can see that is going to be there as one of the greatest challenges for the incoming President. It is especially a challenge – and this is in regard to my comments on the military - in that military also saw all of the charges dropped against officers who were charged previously for human rights abuses in East Timor. So we are looking at a military that is still very strong and the possibility of a military solution in Aceh in which the military has a fair amount of authority in how to handle the issues there.

I turn to Papua. The interesting issue here is it was largely - if you think about the rise of the Papua issue subsequent to *reformasi* - it was a largely civilian movement that was allowed to emerge in 2000 and 2001. And it gained some measure of legitimacy among Papuans in the form of two people's congresses and a Papuan Presidium that was formed. These, of course, were subsequently decimated. There was an arrest of Presidium leaders and ultimately the assassination of Theys Eluay who was the head of the Papuan Presidium. This sealed the fate of this approach. "Special autonomy" was also extended to Papua and was partially an initiative of local Papuans. This was a good deal. But despite the fact that the original version had been drafted by people such as the head of Cendrawasih University and other local pro-government elite in Papua, the deal was diluted significantly. But still its major components were very good. For Papua it was a very good package. It was seen as a framework they could work with. And there could be some progress. Many saw this package as being appropriate. However, special autonomy here was undermined as well. It was undermined once again when Megawati insisted on implementing a previously law