

fact that so much changed during and after the CFE negotiations, in fact, the treaty's *principal* legacy to security in Europe may turn out to be the establishment of a forum for developing discussion and agreement about conventional military power on the continent.⁵ In the mid-1990s the prospect of NATO's eventual enlargement to include former members of Warsaw Pact was part of such discussion, and Moscow's occasionally threatening comments about an enlarged Alliance indicated to Western governments that the CFE forum might be critical in assuaging Russian insecurities.⁶ The resolution of the "flank dispute" at the Review Conference of May 1996 is an example of this reasoning in action. In order to avoid having to declare Russia "non-compliant" with treaty standards, the CFE signatories permitted Moscow higher force levels than initially stipulated for the Leningrad Military District in Russia's north and the North Caucasus Military District in the south. The concessions were in part an acknowledgement of Russia's vast geography and the fact that the force limits in the southern flank in particular were irksome to Moscow in light of the revolt in Chechnya.⁷

At the 1996 conference the CFE member-states recognized above all the need to adapt to fundamental changes in the European security environment and to thereby sustain and renew the CFE as a key pillar in the continent's security arrangements. The process was completed at the summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the signing of an *Agreement on Adaptation* along with a *Final Act* featuring a politically-binding text relating to restraint and progressive reductions. By that time, however, change in Europe was of a quality, speed and magnitude that the CFE's initial purpose and provisions had become much less relevant. As late as 1999 the Confidence and Security-Building Mechanisms (CSBMs) in the OSCE's *Vienna Document* included a requirement for advance notice of military exercises to prevent the surprise massing of large forces but did not address the smaller forces typical of ethnic or instate conflict typical of the serial wars of the Yugoslav succession.⁸ Additionally, the prospect of enlargement both of NATO and the European Union (EU) promised to eclipse the CFE security regime in Central and Eastern Europe by reconfiguring relations between Russia and Western Europe.

⁵ Falkenrath, pp.68-76; Jeffrey D. McCausland, "Carts and Horses: Strategy and Arms Control for a New Europe," *Parameters*, Vol.29, No.1, 1999, pp.25-42.

⁶ The Partnership for Peace (PfP) established at the NATO summit of 1994 was in part intended to avoid a hasty decision on NATO enlargement. When the Russian foreign minister, Andrej Kozoyrev, signed an agreement giving Moscow less than full equality with Washington in the PfP, communists and nationalists in the Duma denounced it as "American imperialism" and compared it to *Operation Barbarossa*, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. See John Borwaski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," *International Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2, 1995, pp.233-246 and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 24, 1994, p.2.

⁷ See Richard A. Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings," *International Security*, Vol.19, No.4, 1995, pp.118-144;

Sherman Garnett, *The CFE Flank Agreement*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

⁸ OSCE, *Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures*, <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1990/csbs/vienn99e.htm> Chapter V calls for notification whenever military activity involves at least 9,000 troops, 250 battle tanks, 500 ACVs and 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers. Also John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).