



potential or proposed agreement or measure. Such a matrix would have the criteria on one azimuth and the various agreements or measures on the other. Such a display would facilitate establishing priorities of the criteria for each agreement, reveal possible inconsistencies in applying the criteria to different agreements, and help identify possible conflicts among the agreements themselves. In addition, it would be informative and helpful to those formulating, negotiating, and implementing NACD policies, agreements, and measures to have responsible NACD and intelligence personnel complete these matrices as they believe each party to the agreement would apply the criteria. Although such an activity would be time-consuming and the product could not possibly be completely accurate, it would assist in the identification of the visible and hidden concerns of the other parties which must be taken into account in the NACD process if it is to be successful.

In an ideal world, parties to a negotiation would agree upon what evaluative criteria should be used. It is true that preambles to many agreements set forth objectives, and some stipulate criteria for evaluating the agreement. In reality, however, the best which can be hoped may be that while the parties have different criteria, or different priority orders of such criteria, the criteria are not mutually contradictory. Ultimately, all parties to an agreement or measure, using their own evaluative criteria, must reach the conclusion that they will be better off with the agreement than without it.

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Criteria for evaluating potential agreements or measures to control arms and promote stability. --
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