

Table 7

Surveillance Assets and Ownership

US Space Command	– Pave Paws
	– BMEWS
	– GEODSS
Tactical Air Command	– Interceptors
	– Joint Surveillance System (JSS)
	– Icelandic Sensors
	– DEW Line/North Warning System
	– OTH-B
Air Force Spacetrack System	
	– BMEWS
	– Pave Paws
	– Cobra Dane
	– other contributing radars
	– Satellite Early Warning System
	– Pacific Barrier Radar
	– Baker-Nunn System
	(including a site at St. Margarets, New Brunswick)
Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR)	
	– 3 transmitting stations, 6 receiving stations
data from	– NAVSPASUR
	– AF — Spacetrack
	– Canadian Operated Sensors
	Space Surveillance Centre — NORAD

and development, there will be a continuing need to stay involved in surveillance technologies no matter how great the commitment to existing programmes.

Finally, the thrust of the ADI programme emphasises once again that US operational doctrines have evolved in directions emphasizing limited nuclear options and nuclear war-fighting, all of which require robust surveillance and threat assessment assets and reflect the continuing erosion of the distinction between “deterrence” and “defence”. As consideration of the NWS reveals, the future US response to bilateral co-operation may also be unpredictable. In general, it is reasonable to assume that even if the US need for joint arrangements with Canada declines, Washington will, as a matter of policy, want to continue to involve Canada in continental defence. However, Canadian *access* to surveillance data, which has been considered to be a primary benefit of the NORAD relationship, may continue to decrease as it has in recent years.