enter on examination of faithfulness to standards of religious duty and religious truth. So long, moreover, as the Church accepts the New Testament teaching, that the national power is the ordinance and minister of God, she cannot, even on spiritual grounds, ignore a duty of consideration and service to the nation as such. So long, on the other hand, as the State regards as of supreme importance the moral and spiritual life of its people, and so long as in respect of the profession of the great mass of its citizens it may be called Christian, it cannot be consistent with true statesmanship to ignore the welfare of the Church, and to fail to acknowledge and to reckon on its moral and spiritual service.

But even so far as this separation can be carried out, I believe—though time will not allow me to give the grounds of that belief—that it inflicts a serious injury on the moral life of the nation, both by interfering with public expression of a national Christianity and by loss of a strong traditional and unquestioned influence over the great mass of the people; that it tends to increase rather than diminish the fatal power of that rivalry of religious Communions, which is properly called sectarianism: that, on the one side, it is apt to infuse, almost of necessity, into statesmanship a strong tinge of secularism—a non-religious attitude, which becomes irreligious; that, on the other side, it tends to foster in the Church the narrowness of an excessive ecclesiasticism, uncorrected by the breadth of national position and national duty.

Of course, under all these conditions, the inherent life of the Church, so long as she is faithful to her sacred trust, will assert itself victoriously, and not only serve God, but bless the nation. Equally, of course, it may become the duty of the Church to face these acknowledged evils rather than lose her rights and liberty and purity of doctrine and practice. But, unless under the sacred necessity of plain spiritual duty, we cannot, I hold, be contented with this relation—if, indeed, it be not a denial of all relation—between Church and State.

4. There remains for us the third condition of what is commonly understood by establishment—the recognition by the State of the Church as a distinct body, and the preservation, to her, although not now including the whole body of the nation, of at least a large measure of her ancient privilege of religious authority and religious leadership in all that concerns the moral and spiritual life of the people. Of course I need not tell you that this relation was never constituted by a formal Act. What the State has formally recognized in a series of Acts from the days of the Toleration Act downwards is the existence and the civil rights of those who have left the communion of the National Church. That Church herself was always (so to speak) taken for granted; her continuity was assumed; her revenues and her privileges were recognized from time immemorial, and her new relation to the State grew up gradually and indirectly—with the irregularities and apparent anomalies characteristic of all natural growths—to what it is now.

Is that relation one which is rationably tenable from the standpoint of the modern State? Is it one that ought to be maintained from the standpoint of the Church?

(*a*) To the first question—in spite of much popular assumption, which is, indeed, easier than argument—I answer unhesitatingly, 'Yes,' on one condition. That condition is the being able to show that the existence of a National Church, open to all, though membership is now voluntary under no legal compulsion, is really a force of supreme power for service to the whole life, especially the intellectual and moral life, of the whole nation; and this condition virtually implies the inclusion within that Church membership of the leading forces of the wealth and power, the education and culture, the religious faith and energy of the country, and the acceptance of its service in various degrees by the great masses of the people. If this condition be realized, is Establishment really inconsistent with modern ideas? On the contrary, Establishment, in the largest sense—the provision for the higher life of the people freely of what they cannot obtain for themselves—is obviously a democratic principle; and it is one which in respect of material, intellectual, æsthetic, even moral forces of influence has increased in my memory enormously, and is increasing every day. The one necessity is to prove this high spiritual value of a National Church, not so much by theoretical argument, but by exhibition of practical power. That our Church is doing this with marvellously increasing energy is the confession of all, friends and foes alike. In this—though I depreciate no other forces—is, from the national point of view, the one supreme force of Church defence.

(*b*) Ought that relation to be maintained from the side of the Church?

Again, 'Yes,' on one supreme condition—that the Church is substantially free for the discharge of her spiritual duty to God and man; free in the determination and maintenance of Christian truth; free in the ministration of Christian grace; free in her own self government of order, ritual discipline. There is nothing in the idea and purpose of Establishment to prevent—there should be much to preserve—such freedom; for if you consider the matter, you must see how truly it is for the interest of the State that the Church should be free, provided always that her freedom be not abused either to the injury of those without, or oppression of those within. The very nature of her service is such that it can neither be bought nor enforced. To be real and valuable it must be free. It is only a shallow and self-defeating statemanship which is greedy of a meddlesome State control.

How really stand we in this all-important matter? Even now I unhesitatingly maintain in spite of much loose talk about State bondage hardly worth refutation; in spite of some real hindrances and embarrassments of which I do not think lightly—that as far as the spiritual ministry of the Church of England is concerned there is no body of men in Christendom so free as our clergy to do their high duty according to whatever light God has given them.

But there are incidents—as I should hold abuses—of Establishment, some paralysis of legislation, some impropriety of jurisdiction, some anomalies of patronage, which the Church is now feeling more keenly than of old, just because of greater fervour, of higher and wider aspiration.

Can these be swept away? Why not? In almost all cases they are anachronisms—survivals in law from that old condition of identity of Church and State, reasonable, perhaps, then; quite unreasonable now. Their removal is but right adaptation to the present actual relation of the Church to the State. Let this be clearly seen, and I, for one, believe that they may be removed, if Churchmen are so thoroughly in earnest that they will insist on their rights.

But, again, there is a condition, in relation to which I know that I enter on controverted ground, and I desire to speak with the utmost plainness. It is that we recur in principle to that which, in spite of some confusion in theory, was in practice the fundamental idea of English Church action in the sixteenth century. I mean a thorough recognition of the constitutional rights of the faithful laity—as they are recognized, for example, fully and frankly in almost all the daughter Churches of the Anglican Communion. Let not the clergy be afraid of these. I believe that this acknowledgment of a constitutional right, with its accompanying limitation and responsibility, would be the best safeguard against the assertion of a rough, arbitrary lay power—the power of popular clamour and of intolerant prosecution, the power of improper and arbitrary patronage, the sordid power of the purse. But I am sure that it is the necessary condition of a frank recognition by the State of what should be the true condition of things—the free self-government of the Church, and the interposition of the State only so far as Church action may injure the interest of the nation and the rights of its citizens.

Take, for example, the legislation which we so greatly need on many points, and for want of which, as has been repeatedly shown, the judicial power is almost inevitably driven to encroachment. Who can doubt that the principle is right which is involved in the proposal that it should be initiated by our own Church assemblies and formally confirmed by Royal assent, while Parliament—now an assembly wholly unlike the Parliaments of the sixteenth century—should simply have the right of address to the Crown if the proposed legislation seemed to usurp or encroach on the domain of national authority? Virtually, as it seems to me, and within broad and well-defined limits, this is the position of the General Assembly in Scotland. But while our Church assemblies—I speak of them with all respect—fall so plainly short of a true representative assembly of the whole Church, in which clergy and laity have their right co-ordination, and, I will add, as of great practical moment, although they may vote separately, sit and confer together—I earnestly desire, but I have little hope, that this right condition will be realised.

Look, again, at the burning question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, on which I cannot but express my deep regret that no fruit has yet been reaped from the invaluable labors of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission of seven years ago, and my painful sense of the danger of our drifting, especially in these times of general unsettlement and disintegration, into some measure of anarchy and virtual Congregationalism. Clearly where they have to judge of doctrine, ritual, discipline, they should be Church courts, acknowledging Church law, and composed of those who have the privilege and loyalty of Church membership. But is a Church court necessarily a purely clerical court? Is it right to assume that the Supreme Court, which is the one really in question, should necessarily be composed of ecclesiastics, and that, if it admits lay Churchmen, it loses its spiritual character? I know that this is constantly assumed, and appeal made to some parts of the Reformation statutes as acknowledging it. But is it really true in essential principle? Is it wise in policy? Remember, though it is often forgotten, that the court has to satisfy not the clergy only, but the laity, who, in the present condition of Church government, have no other legal protection. Ask yourselves, if you desire to have a court which shall best interpret law and do unbiassed justice, whether a purely clerical tribunal is necessarily the one thing to desire and fight for. Ask yourselves also—for this is to our present purpose—whether it is likely that the State through law will recognize such a court in the position of dignity and immense power, which belongs to the Supreme Court of the Church of England.

Consider, lastly, the defects of our system of patronage. Look at that abomination of the public sale of livings, which ought not to be tolerated for a day, and against which the chief authorities of our Church have protested again and again. Or look even at some of the anomalies of private and official patronage, which have become anomalies, chiefly by change of circumstances, such as the extinction of some old social relations, and the change of the position of the Crown in relation to Parliamentary power. That these matters are not of the essence of Establishment the example of Scotland abundantly proves. That under them we have a body of English clergy—parish priests, dignitaries, Bishops—of whom we may well be proud, is no sufficient argument against