

'This goes,' it would appear, 'upon the most absurd and untenable ground that the minority is a unit as well as the majority.' Now if the *Globe* knew anything at all about Mr. Hare's system, it could never have penned this sentence, for the exact reverse is the truth. That system regards neither the majority nor the minority as a unit, but as being made up of units, each of them being an individual, who thinks for himself and would vote, not for the nominee forced upon him, whether he likes him or no but for the man of his choice, or at any rate, some man of whose principles and character he approves. It is of the very essence of 'personal representation' that it recognizes only one unit—the individual man between whom and the exercise of the franchise it permits no officious party mediator. It is the party system, with its devices of wire-pulling caucus and intrigue, which makes of both the existing parties a unit in the same sense as a flock of driven sheep may be termed a unit. Some new light is thrown upon the subject of 'hobbies' by the assertion that they are peculiarly characteristic of the minority. Prohibition is a 'hobby,' according to our contemporary, and yet its advocates are, for the most part, Reformers, and we suppose the *Globe* would contend that they form the majority. Majority and minority, in the article referred to, have in fact an equivocal meaning, sometimes being used to signify the parties respectively in power and in opposition, and elsewhere to signify sections of either or both parties riding 'hobbies,' which are or are not kept well in hand, and even national fractions of a party, united merely by the accident of birth. It is urged as a fatal objection to 'personal representation', that each of these fractions of the community could then if it chose be represented according to its numbers. Supposing that to be the case, what harm would be done? Would it not be a simple piece of justice? Take the Irish Roman Catholics of Ontario for example, who are in a chronic state of discontent on this subject. Under Mr. Hare's system they could only expect such influence as their numbers would entitle them to exert, and would probably exert much less, because a respectable number, perhaps a majority of them, would prefer the triumph of particular measures or opinions to the claims of

nationality. Individual Irishmen, of course, could do as they pleased, but the body could no longer blame the parties with denying a rightful share in the representation, because the remedy would be in their own hands. And the same is true of the Prohibitionists and all other 'hobby' riders. The 'personal' system has no magic at its command by which to transform a minority into a majority, as Mr. Matthew Cameron once appeared to suppose; on the contrary, its chief purposes are, first, to make sure that what appears to be a majority in the Legislature is really a majority, and secondly, that every individual voter should be represented in fact and not constructively by a figment of the imagination. The argument in proof of the opinion that 'the decision of the majority, when fairly ascertained'—which, by the way, it never is under the existing system—'should determine the national action' is a work of supererogation, for who ever disputed the proposition? What the advocates of personal representation desire is to ensure that the majority shall be 'fairly ascertained.' Of a piece with that is the fatuous *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, that if you represent minorities in Parliament, they must be represented proportionately in the Cabinet! Surely the *Globe* has not forgotten that a minority is now represented in the House of Commons; does it seriously believe that Sir John Macdonald and Dr Tupper are entitled to seats in the present Administration?

The reasons why the leaders of party are opposed to 'personal representation' lie on the surface. It would at once and forever put an end to the trade of the political dictator, with his aides, wirepullers, and other assistant schemers. There would be freedom of candidature and freedom of choice for the elector. Parties would continue to flourish, no doubt, much as they do under the existing system; but their tactics and their management would undergo a beneficent reformation. No elector would be obliged either to vote with his party for a candidate he disliked and perhaps despised, or to support the nominee of the other side. As matters stand at present, he is often compelled to do one or the other, unless he prefers to lose his vote altogether. Under the Convention system, as it used invariably to be and still is, to some extent,