

your definitive or permanent objective, there are various minor objects and successes to be obtained, which serve as so many links leading up to it. These objects are the intermediate objective points "above cited"; because they interpose between your first and last steps in the campaign; they are the halts or restings in your journey, at which you stop to gather breath and recruit your forces, for strength to make further efforts towards the goal of your hopes, and without which it would be impossible to carry on a well-contested conflict. These intermediate points for which you manoeuvre may or may not have been jotted down in your chart or scheme of the war. It may have been your fixed plan to have seized them in succession, as success opened up your path, or they may have been merely accidental openings or clearances allowed by unexpected success, or mistakes of your enemy, and which you eagerly snatched at. On this account these points of "vantage" may be sometimes called "accidental objectives" when derived this way. Thus you perceive these points whether "permanent," "intermediate" or "accidental," are called "objective," solely because they form the aims or objects by which in your plan you hope to realize success. Practically they differ but little in degree from other points which are called strategic. Although a strategic point need not be an objective one, yet all objective ones must necessarily be strategic.

We have not space to extract the description of bases of operations, and their different kinds and advantages. The author is, we think, at his best when, having disposed of his preliminary definitions, he comes to describe lines of operations and their uses. After showing that many roads must be used by an army advancing on a given point, he gives the following excellent description of the necessity of "lines of communication," and the necessity of protecting the flanks:—

It may be laid down as an invariable rule in war, never to march your army so that its fractional parts may not be able to unite at any specified time and moment; and another, that the point of junction laid down for them should be ever so far out of the reach, that is, in advance of the enemy, that under no possibility can he forestall such union by the interposition of his army, whole or in part. Previously to the march of any system of columns forming an army, their points of concentration should be distinctly laid down, as well for a retreat as the advance; moreover, it would never do for any one column, after reception of a check from the enemy, to fall back so rapidly as to uncover the flank or flanks of the collateral columns on one or both sides, as the case may be, without due warning given. On this account, the intercommunication of intelligence, by bands of mounted troops, forming communicating links—flying columns of larger dimensions, and so called from their mobile qualities, being tied to no fixed base, possessing a light equipment and great rapidity of movement, scouts, field telegraphy and every other method by which intelligence can be communicated—should be established. This necessity for mutual warning and support must never be lost sight of for a moment by the columnar fragments of an army marching in an enemy's country, and for this reason such columns must always have given them one of direction, into which the others must endeavor to feel as far as practicable; and could this column of direction march parallel to some natural and not easily passable obstacle, as a range of mountains, presenting no defiles by which

an enemy can suddenly debouch, a large unbridged river, requiring boats or a pontoon train to cross it, or the frontier of a friendly State, then the danger of attack from your enemy is reduced two thirds. Should your lines of operation give you a similar advantage upon the other flank of your army as well, then this danger is diminished to one-third, for you have only a central attack to apprehend. A flank attack is always the most to be dreaded; it is a species of attack you are ever on the watch to inflict upon your enemy, and consequently in the expectation similarly, to receive from him; and whether you march from your base by one of many columns, you are always exposed to this attack, unless you can cover your flanks by such obstacles as those above described—both flanks, if possible, one, if not, which will then become the flank of appui into which the army feels and by which it marches. But there are many theatres of operation in which no such obstacles exist for the protection of your flanks, or where, at least you cannot take advantage of them. In such case, you march by the centre and refuse your flanks, that is, you hold back the columns forming the extremities of the wings so as to let the centre ones keep on in front; as you may sometimes see (by the way of illustration) an impatient nurse dragging by each hand two unwilling children, in her walk, who would rather be carried. The nurse here represents the bulk of an advancing army; the refractory children, its refused extremities. This, after all, is nothing but a direct movement on a large scale from the centre. When you have a range of obstacles upon one side only, it is usual and advisable to refuse the flank of the army upon which no obstacle exists—(the flank is called the reverse)—letting that column nearest the obstacle get well ahead; in other words; marching your army in direct echelon from the protected flank. This will make an enemy very cautious how he attacks you upon the exposed flank, since, to do so, is to expose one of his own to the attacks of these columns echeloned in front of the flank at tacked. (A few pencil strokes upon paper will at once show the truth of this.)

The "Pons Asinorum" of strategic novices—the subject of interior and exterior lines—is thus dealt with by our author. —

If you and your enemy are marching to oppose each other in the theatre of war by several routes or roads, but your fractions—that is, columns—move in such a manner that you can unite them upon any one point before your enemy can unite his to oppose you at the same point, then you are said to move upon *interior lines* with regard to him, and he, of course, moves upon *exterior lines* with regard to you, and *vice versa*. This can be otherwise explained by drawing a circle upon paper, and cutting off any arc from it by a straight line; now representing the fractions of your enemy by a series of detached dots, or short strokes, arranged any where upon this line within the circle, while you represent the army of your enemy by a series of similar dotlings disposed either upon the circumference itself, or just outside it. It is evident that if in uniting all these dots—as you would unite little globules of quicksilver upon a plate or table—into one mass, you move on the line, while your enemy, in order to unite his, has to move them on the rim of the circle or outside it you unite your fractions in a shorter time than he can, because you have a shorter road to go. Then you are said to move on interior lines with regard to him, he moving upon exterior lines with regard to you. Place his movements within the circle and

yours outside, then you reverse the terms. Such may be called the mathematical definition of these expressions, but they are susceptible of another, with which the idea of a circle has nothing at all to do. I call it a physical distinction, because it depends upon the answer to the following question; Can any two or more separate columns of your army march faster than any two or more corresponding columns of the enemy? If so, they can possibly unite upon a given spot in shorter time than can the enemy, although they may have a longer distance to go, and thus realize the same advantage as if they moved in the manner above described. We often see this in the cricket-field; the ball may fall near a man "fielding," he runs to catch it, but owing to want of speed he is overtaken by another running faster, who catches it before him, although he may have had twice the distance to run. This latter moves upon *interior lines* with regard to the former solely owing to the ability to get over the ground more rapidly: And so with armies; a rapidly marching army moving round an arc of a circle, with reference to a badly marching army moving within it, may be said to move upon *interior lines*, notwithstanding the distance moved over. This fact explains the saying that "victories are more frequently won by the legs of an army than its weapons." A truth which ought never to be lost sight of by those in whose hands rests the training of soldiers.

Captain Stone has performed his task well and has given us an elementary treatise, which will be useful not only to the classes for whom he intends it, but as a useful preparation for the study of such works as those of General M'Dougall and Colonel Hamley. We have already objected to the introduction of religious and moral reflections in such a pamphlet as that before us, and we must more strongly protest against a totally uncalled for and very silly political diatribe in which Captain Stone has seen fit to indulge. The animus of it cannot be misunderstood, and it is very much regretted that it should find a place in a work written by an officer professedly for soldiers. We trust that Captain Stone's useful pamphlet will reach a second edition, and that this offensive paragraph will be expunged. We doubt also whether many of the notes might not be left out. If a soldier is sufficiently well educated to read such a book at all, he will hardly require many of the explanations of familiar words given in the notes; and many of the more obscure words might be very easily replaced by simpler ones in the text itself. The notes on technical words, of course must remain, though with one at least of them (one hardly needing a definition) we might quarrel. Admitting the etymological definition of a "soldier" given by Captain Stone, we cannot agree with him that a "soldier" is now only understood to be one serving in a military capacity *for pay*. Indeed, Captain Stone himself admits the right of a Volunteer, who would not necessarily serve for pay, to the title of "soldier." We take a soldier, in the modern sense, to be one who is, or ought to be recognized as duly authorized by the State to which he belongs to fight on its behalf, subject to the laws and entitled to the immunities, acknowledged by civilized nations in respect to such authorized fighting men. One of the great questions between the Prussians and the French was whether the *Francs-Tireurs*, who were certainly not necessarily paid, were "soldiers" or not. The English of Captain Stone's treatise might be revised with advantage. There is a solecism, a redundant use of the conjunction, which is very glaring, and which occurs