

lution precedes evolution. The outward in all its phases is but the projection of the life within. "Historically," says the author, "the moral life did not begin by laying down general principles of conduct, but by forming codes of concrete duties. In this respect the moral life is the analogue of the mental life. The latter, also, did not begin with abstract speculative principles, or with theories of knowledge, but with specific acts of knowing. In both alike the knowledge of principles was second and not first, and in both alike principles were implicit from the beginning." (P. 1.)

The significance of this statement, with its underlying spiritual conceptions of both knowledge and morality, is more fully brought out in the following: "That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterward that which was spiritual. But the spiritual is not something apart from the natural, as a kind of detached movement; it is rather the natural itself rising toward its ideal form through the free activity of the moral person. The natural can be understood only through the spiritual to which it points, and the spiritual gets contents only through the natural in which it roots." (P. 304.) He attempts "to rationalize our moral experience by passing behind the instinctive form to the underlying principle. In this way we hope at once to escape the scepticism suggested by conflicting cases and to get some better guidance for life itself." (P. 2.)

These quotations will give a definite idea of the aim of the author, and of the deep spiritual conceptions underlying not only the treatise on ethics, but his entire treatment of the problems of philosophy. Together they constitute one of the best antidotes to the shallow materialism that masquerades in the name of science and philosophy.

Works on ethics abound whose aim has been to "study the genesis and development of moral ideas and of practical codes, . . . the psychological faculties concerned in the production of moral ideas, the nature of conscience, the relation of desire and will, and of reason and sensibility." (P. 3.) England has been especially fruitful in producing works of this character. This has, doubtless, been due to the influence of Locke, and as