

is complied with, the impulse is pacified. This is the direct performance of duty. But if I fail to comply with the impulse, and I do him positive injury (which will not undo), then this is a case of duty violated; and the violation of this duty instantly excites in me a subjective sense or feeling, that I ought to make him reparation by an act of compensative justice; and it is pacified when I put him into the relation which it suggests. If I fail even in doing this, there arises within me a subjective sense of ill-desert, closely followed by another of "oughtness," that I should be punished. Had the conduct of this neighbour toward me been more than simple justice required of him, while my own act towards him was less than simple justice made requisite, the subjective feeling excited by the knowledge of his conduct would have been an "oughtness" that he should be rewarded; while that excited by my own act would have been an "oughtness" that I should be punished.

Both rewards and punishments are thus the offspring of subjective sense or feeling, and are examples of compensative justice. The latter, however, is often called retributive justice. Therefore, subjective feelings of conscience, arising on violation of duty, seek pacification in the relations or character of compensative or retributive justice.

Most of the feelings of conscience are in general so active in religious or well-trained moral natures, that the appellation of permanent or constant is more applicable to them than the term occasional. Many of them are continually in exercise, as the senses of right, wrong, etc.; while others are only occasionally so, as approbateness, remorse, despair, etc.

Their Subdience or Abatement.

As most of the subjective feelings of conscience are constantly active or permanent, most of them abate or subside but temporarily—that is, for the time being—by putting the exciting object into pacificatory relations or character.

As already remarked, all the subjective feelings of conscience may be divided into two general classes: (1) Those relating to the proper discharge of duty or its reward; and (2) those relating to the violation of duty or its direct retributive compensation. These classes might also admit of still more minute subdivision.

The first of these general classes is largely made up of the subjective feelings of "oughtness" or "ought-not-ness," as, indeed, so also is the second.

In everything relating to the proper discharge of duty, these subjective "ought-nesses" and "ought-not-nesses" of the first class are voices within us, plainly marking out our duty, and stimulating us to perform it. Their voice is one of inflexible authority, and they demand perfect obedience. Their impulse is not a begging petition, but an authoritative order that will be quieted only by our putting the exciting object into the pacifying character or relation.

Then, again, as members of the first class, and as stimulatives to duty, we have the subjective senses of acquittiveness and condemnativeness aroused by the perception of right or wrong acts; also, approbateness and disapprobateness, the subjective senses appropriate to the principles of good and evil.

We need not go on particularizing other equally important members of this class, but we can hardly omit to mention, as included among them, and as stimulatives to duty, the Anticipatory subjective senses, such as fear or apprehensiveness of punishment, expectativeness of reward, etc. They all lift their voices alike, as stimulatives to duty, and point out the good or evil consequences of a certain course of conduct.

If the subject obeys all these warning and stimulating voices within himself, and the right act is done, the subjective feelings of well-desert, self-approbateness, or expectativeness of reward, all bring into his experience an amount of felicity which is itself a reward.

If, however, all members of the first class fail in stimulating to the right act, and it is neglected till the chance to perform it is gone, or the wrong act is done, the subject is not yet given up, but given over to those subjective feelings of the Second Class aroused by a violation of duty. The "oughtnesses" or "ought-not-nesses" within his mind still clamour loudly their urgent demands. If direct compensation is possible, they importunately urge him to make it; if wrong is done, they urge him to make amends for it; if right neglected, they insist on immediate compensative rectification. A thousand voices within his brain are still heard by him, commanding, urging, threatening; but if all fail, and the opportunity of direct compensation is gone beyond recall, these and other subjective "oughtnesses" within him of the same class, light fiercer fires, or rather utter harsher voices. They demand retributive compensation; and nothing he can do will allay the torment they create within him till he grants the pacification of their impulse in his own punishment. He becomes the prey of the subjective senses of ill-desert, remorse, or despair, because he has treated their kinder voices with neglect.

As illustrative of their mode of working, in cases like this, we add a simple example.

"Ought-not-ness" is equal to "oughtness," only it refers to the negative side of an act.