

took place previously. This is where the "mental latency" of Hamilton comes in.

6. The ego, or its consciousness, is not attached to the actual particles of matter, since these are changed in a comparatively short time by waste and renewal. It may be attached to the form or the atomic structure, in some respect: but, however, that may be, at the moment before gemmation, the particles and their form are part of the original mass, as the medium, if not the home, of their egos, and the reasoning is the same.

7. Consciousness, in our actual Experience, never consists of a single element; but is always exceedingly complex, as all know who have ever tried to record all the elements present in an ordinary moment of consciousness. What with clear and subconscious presentations, and boundless shadowy suggestions, there is no such mighty engine-room as a soul. We find each of these presentations and suggestions connected with the life-operations of some local cell or cell-group. By what process are they psychologically bound into one continuing whole (continuum)? Do not the lower blend with the higher in the same states of consciousness.

8. Is the process this:—that the continuum of our consciousness consists of a series of constantly changing groups of units of consciousness (consisting each of a subject—and—object aspect) constantly coalescing together and receding from coalescence? And that this power of coalescing and decoalescing is an innate law of consciousness? Does the larger, more permanent, more vivid group, call itself the "I"? This part of my theory resembles the family of theories of the kind

9. Is it not erroneous to think that we cannot conceive ourselves except as separate from each other, when embryology and histology appear to prove that we were once united; and when so many streams combine in our mental life; and when we move so inevitably with the movement of the whole conscious as well as the apparently unconscious world? Why then should it be asserted so positively by certain analysts of consciousness that "I am I, altogether separate from every other I"—"I can never be another"—"I shall remain unique to all eternity, or absolutely die"—"I am indivisible"—"I am the same throughout all my states of consciousness"—"To unite with another would be to lose my identity"—"It would be equivalent to eternal extinction." Are these propositions really correct? Are we not noting but superficially an apparent unity—the psychological presentation of our own unanalyzed consciousness? Is not its apparent unity after all indivisible? When I say "I," ought I not to say "we"? Is not the Ego a Nos?

We have each a separate general individuality running through our lives; but is it not a cluster of coalescences around a central dominant Ego; and do not the facts of coalescence themselves refuse us the right to insist on the old kind of permanent and indivisible separation? And do they not claim for us an infinite world of conscious union?"

*Justus*.—I have been most patient. But allow me to remark that it might have been better for you to have set forth with exactitude the his-