

Higher cost
of construction
offset by
lower fuel cost

or economic areas. Despite the claim *The Financial Times* reported on October 22 from Fishlock's Central Generating Board sources that power was produced more cheaply by American-style reactors than any others (which thus included CANDU), our evidence was that there was little to choose between the two in the cost area. Including initial fuel load and heavy water, the CANDU's construction cost was estimated to be about 10 percent higher than an American reactor's. But when it came to producing power once it was built, CANDU began to show to advantage with lower fuel costs—the difference between natural and enriched uranium prices. As far as Atomic Energy was concerned both reactors were fully safe. What advantage, if any, had CANDU?

We imagined that CANDU's biggest advantage would be its similarity to one of the reactors Britain itself had been developing. The political row over choosing an American reactor that the news reports had predicted drew its potential from the fact Britain had been the first nation to have a nuclear-power plant. Would its political leadership really be able to face open admission before the world that Britain had now lost out in the nuclear-power stakes?

It was decided at the High Commission that the most promising tactic would be to emphasize the possibilities for Canada and Britain together to produce the steam-generating heavy-water reactor, both for Britain's immediate nuclear-power needs and as a team competing in other countries with the two big American producers of reactors, Westinghouse and General Electric. Should the British decision go in this direction, it would be correct to present it as a decision to remain with British technology. Meanwhile, Canada's more advanced pressure-tube reactor technology would be waiting modestly in the wings, available for any gaps in Britain's reactor know-how that needed filling to ensure that future "steamers" worked up to expectations. And we should have attained our primary objective.

Walker willingly went along with Gillespie's proposals. Plans were soon made for a visit to London by Gray and other Atomic Energy officials. A full-scale technical presentation of the CANDU case would be given to British nuclear-energy authorities from government and industry on November 26 in Canada House. By this time, the press office had sent two memoranda to the High Commissioner, one, dated November 1, formally recommending a media briefing about CANDU and

another, dated November 8, recommending an advertising campaign.

Going public

Following more diplomatic soundings through the private channel, and more exchange of telegrams and telephone conversations between Ottawa and the High Commission, a decision was made on November 20 that the campaign should be carried out both public as well as private. A news release was issued on November 21 announcing the visit of Gray and his team. It stated that Atomic Energy of Canada was "interested in Anglo-Canadian co-operation in the construction and marketing of heavy water reactors as future sources of electricity". It also informed the media that Gray would hold a news conference at Canada House on November 27. While the Canadian campaign had been getting its gear, the forecast row over the British decision had been building up almost in the news media. Gray's news conference was better attended than any, except that of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, that I attended during my four years at Canada House.

The public diplomacy campaign began in earnest. Fishlock learned of the Gray visit and reported it in *The Financial Times* on November 21 under a four-column headline: "Canadian bid to produce heavy water type reactor to U.K." This accurately summarized the Canadian line of attack: "A fresh Canadian bid to persuade the British Government of the advantages of an Anglo-Canadian collaboration on the heavy water type reactor technology be made early next week." Gray's news conference lasted nearly two hours and provided a thorough background briefing, supported by printed materials for reporters, about the CANDU and Canadian interests in marketing its technology. "Canada woos U.K. on power" was the headline next morning in *The Guardian*. "Canada enters the lists" reported *Financial Times* across four columns. "Nuclear power: a Canadian option" reported *The Times* across five columns.

In *The Edinburgh Scotsman*, the correspondent Frank Frazer reported on his visit to Glasgow of Atomic Energy's Vice-President (now President, following Gray's retirement), John S. Foster. He had gone there while Gray had his news conference, to discuss with South of Scotland Electricity Board officials the possibility of Canadian collaboration on the next nuclear power station in Scotland.

During the next seven months, Gray visited Britain three more times, each with as much attendant publicity as

Canada-Britain
technological
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emphasized