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might be the time of invasion: there would be bombarding of British harbours, of London, etc., on a scale never thought of; aerial fighting in the air; there might even be a state of confusion which would result in the Allied forces finding themselves drawn into conflict here and there with each other. In the matter of confidence of the King, the enemy might easily be supplied with information.

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He spoke of the U.S. never having thanked the Irish for what they were doing to help - possibly they would have got more thanks if they had done less. How deep his feeling in the matter was, was

apparent from his saying to me that when I had presented him to the possible dangers, at all costs, and take account of every contingency. That, behind the notes there should be some desire to bring the war was, I believed, wholly without any foundation. I said I could understand De Valera's wondering why the United States request should have been preferred in writing, in formal notes, rather than by verbal representations in the first instance. I had been asking myself what the reason for that could be. I had considered, and I thought quite rightly, it was because of the great importance which the U.S. Government attached to seeing that their forces were protected in every possible way. To leave matters to verbal representation might create differences of view later on as to what really had been said. Apart from this, however, I felt that the notes were preferred, in part as a matter of emphasis, and in part as a matter of record. Should present fears prove to be justified, it was most important that the United States be able to show that they had foreseen the dangers clearly and had gone as far as they possibly could in seeking to avoid them. So far as there being any policy by way of drawing the war into the war was concerned, I felt that if such was the case we in Canada would most certainly have had some knowledge of a move of the kind. Also, were there any deep laid policy with respect to what further moves would follow, if the Irish would not meet the request, particularly in the nature of open coercion, we would most certainly have heard something before this about conditions which necessitated such a course. The whole matter had only come to our attention after the notes themselves had been presented. Before the conversation was over, De Valera seemed to change his attitude, based on suspicion, as to some sinister act of Britain being behind the note, on a direct attitude of antagonism towards the President of the United States. I was greatly surprised at this.