

that what the state should aim at is not the mechanical unity resulting from similarity, but that he ought to have aimed at what we might call an organic unity, a unity in diversity, a unity which is consistent with a difference in the immediate interests & position of the several individuals who compose it. e.g. "a state is not made up of same kind of men but diff't kinds of men, for similars do no constitute a state."

But that commonism will not attain even the end of unity of sentiment, wh Plato had made the one object to be aimed at, because the state of things wh Plato desires will be one in wh there is no strong personal interest of any kind. — here he probably exaggerates — one need have to distinguish between various kinds of common property. where collective ownership means only a sort of alternate personal enjoyment we can agree with him that it will not arouse any strong sense of harmony. yet where object can be enjoyed by all at same time & public park, where common feeling shall not grow up Aristotle's criticism is right to extent that common ownership is not of itself sufficient to create a strong harmonious interest. —

We may pass over his criticism of common ownership — easy task to show difficulties wh will arise

in common property we may distinguish 4 main arguments. He begins by distinguishing