

(d) *French Position*

It is difficult to understand the vagaries of French policy in the Agency but it is the consensus of opinion that France is sensitive to its exclusion from the so-called "Nuclear Weapons Club" and is determined to resist (or at least not to facilitate) any decision which would suggest that France has an inferior status to that of the Big Three (U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.)

*Conclusion*

My general conclusion is that, despite continuing declarations of support by all members for the high objectives of the Agency, the whole experiment is likely to founder in a period when the prospect of economic nuclear power is somewhat remote because of political obstruction, weak administration, uninspired leadership and generally mediocre representation. These adverse influences can only be countered if dynamic direction is provided either individually or on a concerted basis by some of the small, more competent delegations like those of Canada, South Africa, Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan.

If it is realistic to assume that the Agency has a constructive role to play it is essential to restore the original perspective by re-focussing attention on the mutual benefits to be derived from a successful programme and at the same time to lay the groundwork for a concerted effort to prevent the U.S.S.R. and others from obstructing further progress. In particular, I would take further steps to ensure that the large majority of small uncommitted states understands more clearly their true interest in the Agency and that they are not misled by the captious proposals of the U.S.S.R. I would begin with a calculated effort to demonstrate clearly both in private and in open debate to the under-developed countries that their interests can best be served by supporting the position of those members of the Western community like the U.S.A. and Canada which have given tangible evidence of their willingness and ability to assist the smaller countries by providing large voluntary contributions to the Agency's programmes. If necessary, attention should be focussed on the sharp contrast between Russian declarations and performance.

It is paradoxical that our main opposition in the Agency on many questions is supported or even led by the representative of India, often taking positions similar to those of the U.S.S.R. I do not consider it consistent with the development of mutual interests to continue to give maximum assistance to India by acts such as provision of the Canada-India reactor and other forms of aid without more forthright attempts at the highest level to develop clear and explicit agreement on mutually acceptable objectives in the nuclear field.

Similarly, I have never understood why we should not be taking more forthright positions in our relations with many members of the Agency, like France, which have given only divided support to the establishment of an international system of safeguards.

In Vienna I encouraged Mr. Wershof to take firm initiatives on questions before the Board and I believe that we were largely in agreement on issues that arose while I was present. It seems to me that although there are real and deep-rooted differences of approach between member states, some at least of the current difficulties of the Agency (such as the choice of the Secretary-General) are attributable to the "conventional wisdom" of international diplomacy which seems to prefer an outward appearance of harmony rather than to invite sharp and possibly embarrassing conflicts that might arise by firm confrontation of opposing viewpoints. Discussion might also take place with the U.S. to ensure that their participation in the Agency will provide the leadership and direction necessary not only to sustain but revitalize the Agency's effectiveness. I believe that the time has come for a critical and penetrating re-evaluation of the objectives of Canadian policy in the Agency and the steps most likely to achieve these aims.

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