lowered at the bidding of a besieger for want of succour from the sca, our great base of operations. Especially does it hold good in the case of a maritime fortress such as Quebec, where "Field-Marshal "Frost" prevents the possibility of a longer investment than five summer months; and even in summer the mighty sweep of the St. Lawrence would render complete investment almost an impossibility to the invader, who could not transport very heavy guns and their enormous weight of ammunition for a long distance over difficult country, with few and bad roads, impassable in the spring

and autumn.1

The defender, holding the river within the circle of forts, could throw his whole force on a section of the enemy divided by the St. Lawrence and separated by it from their base of operation and line of retreat. The complete railway systems at the command of Prussia did not enable her to bring heavier guns than 60-pounders in her siege train. There are certain physical data which do not alter, viz., the strength of men and horses, the badness of country roads, Railroads, from the numerous other calls upon them in war, have been found incapable of transporting very heavy artillery. It is hardly to be supposed that the mistress of the seas and her eldest daughter, Canada, the commercial navy of which already ranks third among the commercial navies of the world, would permit the siege train destined for the attack on Quebec to be conveyed by sca. The armament, therefore, of Quebec might easily be superior to that broug' against it even by hostile ironclads, whose unarmoured decks would be exposed to the citadel fire, which, with the addition of a few torpedoes at the Traverse, would secure the St. Lawrence, if those upon whom the responsibility devolves considered the subject of sufficient importance to warrant a comparatively trifling expenditure, and to prevent, while there is yet time, the erection of buildings which would close the most important lines of fire.

Frontier.

Having considered the strategic conditions with reference to the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, it remains to consider those of the south with reference to the natural bases and lines of an enemy's operations and the objective he would select for attack. In doing so the question is treated merely in a military and, it is hoped, philosophic spirit, such as cannot give offence to our kinsmen of the great Anglo-Saxon Republic with whom the most friendly relations exist, but they have not always been able to restrain the lawless bands of Fenians and their sympathizers who have from time to time raided

^{1 1875} was the centenary of the winter expedition of Generals Montgomery and Arnold against Quebee; the latter with incredible hardships came through the State of Maine, and, on the death of his colleague, withdrew the shattered remnants of their force. The new detached forts at Levis completely command the intersection of roads and railways east, west, and south, as well as the valley of the Chaudière and Kennebee road, by which Arnold marched, and they occupy the ground from which Wolfe shelled the town.