

self, and it would only be necessary to make the feeblest efforts to destroy it entirely. Could they have forgotten TURENE's celebrated winter campaign of 1675, against the Allies who had established themselves in Alsace? Did they not know that he destroyed almost in an instant an army three times as strong as his own, although the position of the Allies in Alsace, in 1675, was not near so bad as that of the English in America in 1777? In fine, it is easy to perceive that when the English had succeeded in giving to this immense chain a consistence of which it was not in reality susceptible, they might have remained for two centuries in this position without being able to win the smallest advantage for themselves, and without being able to do the slightest injury to the Americans. * * * *

Had any people ever proposed to themselves the project of carrying on war at a distance of over 3,600 miles, from their capital, (base of supplies) "and subjecting themselves to the necessity of transporting thence the materials for the smallest meal for their whole army. * * * * The English army, however numerous, must have necessarily been employed in guarding the chain of posts which it had occupied, and it could not venture to weaken any one without exposing itself to fatal consequences. In this position it was consequently impossible to undertake the smallest enterprise against the American Provinces, and the Americans would finally remain peaceable possessors of their whole continent." Results demonstrated the justice of the French officer's opinion

Before BURGOYNE left Skenesborough, (now V^o chell, occupied or captured July 6th) in the latter part of July—having lingered three weeks at this point—(Tome's Battles of America I. 500)—that is to say, as soon as the English General had to give up his water transport, he himself tacitly admitted that he comprehended that his campaign was a failure. (Compare Thatcher's Journal, 86.) Anyone who closely examines BURGOYNE'S own testimony must admit this. This was not due to any armed resistance, but to the impediments which SCHUYLER had succeeded in accumulating in his road, by which the natural difficulties of the country had been ren-