

### *Nuclear Safeguards*

With the United Kingdom, agreements covering CANDU/SGHWR (PTHWR) technological exchange, and supply of heavy water. (SGHWR: Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor; PTHWR: Pressure Tube Heavy Water Reactor).

With the Italian company, Pregettazioni Meccaniche Nucleari, a licensing agreement to supply CANDU reactor units in Italy.

The government has reaffirmed the policy guidelines on uranium enrichment as announced on August 1, 1973. Canadian involvement in uranium enrichment will be determined within those guidelines.

Canada has made the decisions on safeguards that I have just outlined in the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which is designed not only to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons but to ensure the benefits of lower cost energy are shared by all nations.

**Some hon. Members:** Hear, hear!

● (1150)

**Mr. Jim Balfour (Regina East):** Mr. Speaker, we on this side of the House welcome any strengthening of the safeguards to restrict Canadian nuclear materials to peaceful applications. As a country with substantial reserves of uranium and the hard-earned technology to build nuclear reactors, Canada now finds itself on the horns of a moral dilemma. On the one hand, the third world is pressing for access to the nuclear energy already enjoyed by the more developed nations. Yet on the other hand, sales of uranium and nuclear reactors to an increasing number of previously non-nuclear nations significantly raise the danger and probability of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are being asked to weigh the goal of achieving equity with regard to energy sources against the spectre of a nuclear holocaust. And let us make no mistake: as we have seen in India, with a supply of uranium and reprocessing technology that is widely available any country can construct a nuclear bomb with the plutonium from a CANDU reactor.

This is why the issue of safeguards on nuclear exports is so vital, and why several questions must be asked about the minister's statement. First, we take for granted from the minister's statement that the retroactive safeguards which he intends to negotiate will be at least as restrictive as those which he has said he intends to impose with respect to future sales of nuclear fuel and technology. Second, let us recognize that Canada maintains three distinct types of nuclear exports: nuclear material, primarily uranium; nuclear equipment, specifically CANDU reactors; and nuclear technology, the know-how to construct these reactors.

To date we have had some success in applying safeguards to the first two types of exports, but the challenge now is to control the uses to which our technology is put. The government's safeguards are not nearly strong enough to do this job effectively. Even though we will, under the new guidelines proposed today by the minister, inspect the CANDU plants we build ourselves in many developing countries, this does nothing to prevent these countries from copying our reactors exactly and their using the

[Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale).]

plutonium produced in such reactors to construct an explosive device. For this reason it seems only reasonable that a further safeguard, before we export our reactors, is to require an agreement which provides for inspection of a nation's entire nuclear facilities, not just the plants we build, to ensure that they are devoted to peaceful uses.

We in this party are particularly concerned about this in view of the minister's reference to the large number of nuclear transactions under negotiation at this time with countries which have not ratified the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I think particularly of Pakistan, Japan, India, Argentina, the Republic of Korea and Italy.

We should be putting all possible pressure on these nations to ratify that treaty and to submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections for which it calls. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, our own ratification of the non-proliferation treaty suggests to me that we should not be shipping nuclear materials to several Euratom countries until they ratify and accept stronger safeguards of the NPT calibre.

The reference in the minister's statement today to the policy guidelines on uranium enrichment announced August 1, 1973 is totally inadequate to meet this situation. The minister's failure to detail specifically the safeguards to be applied to the export of enriched uranium leads to the conclusion that Canada should not involve itself in the export of enriched uranium until specific policies to meet the situation have been worked out and have received the approval of parliament. That, we submit, should be the government's position. But if it is not, and if the government is prepared to go ahead and export enriched uranium from the James Bay area to a country like France—and we have heard this discussed—then it is time the Canadian people were told far more about this project than they have to date.

As the minister knows, the more uranium is enriched, the more easily it is converted into nuclear explosive. Fully enriched uranium is as dangerous and fissile as plutonium itself, the key component of a nuclear bomb. Are we going to export such a substance to a country like France which has an active program of nuclear testing and has never signed the non-proliferation treaty? In 1965, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson, specifically refused to export natural uranium to France. How much more important is it today not to export a far more dangerous form of enriched uranium to that country without absolutely stringent guarantees that it will in no way facilitate or free up their own resources for their military program?

We welcome the minister's assurance that Canada will demand safeguards and inspection rights as strong as those formulated by the IAEA, but as Canada's delegate to that body's eighteenth general conference himself affirmed, those standards are still not strong enough. In particular, as the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Munro) mentioned last week, we must demand a full accounting for all the plutonium produced from Canadian uranium or Canadian built reactors in other countries. In addition to that, to put some teeth into our nuclear contracts, Canada should be working to negotiate an agreement with all uranium producing and reactor selling countries to boycott any nation which acquires nuclear