

United States governments and their principal military advisers, in direct continuation of arrangements made during Mr. Churchill's first visit to Washington for the establishment of combined United Kingdom-United States machinery for cooperation in various phases of the war effort. These combined arrangements were designed to effect closer coordination between these two countries, with each of which Canada maintains especially close and intimate relations. There has not yet been developed out of the combined United Kingdom-United States organizations the more comprehensive institutional organization which a total war effort of all the united nations probably requires. The difficulties in the way which will have to be overcome should be obvious to everybody. Nobody would wish to sacrifice the speed and efficiency which effective strategy demands to the formal exigencies of international representative institutions.

To wage war effectively, all our governments have had to assume unprecedented powers and responsibilities and have had to delegate unprecedented powers and responsibilities. There is constantly room for improvement in the plans by which we are mobilizing our own war effort and integrating it with the war effort of our allies. There has been a good deal of pretty successful improvisation to meet the means of war conditions. New types of joint arrangements, new agencies for mutual aid, new channels for communication and consultation, are being worked out. The framework of over-all cooperation is found in our association with our allies as members of the united nations. This framework is being progressively filled in and strengthened, but the job of constructing a workable international organization for the winning of the war and the maintenance of the peace is far from completed. There are obvious gaps and anomalies in the present arrangements to worry people who seek symmetry above all. I hope to see some of these gaps closed and anomalies removed.

We must somehow succeed in developing methods and instruments of cooperation which will strengthen the spirit of partnership in which all free peoples, large and small, are associated in our common struggle. In doing so we must not prejudice or compromise—in the slightest degree—the concentration of responsibility for strategic decision upon which the successful prosecution of the war depends.

I think that statement will appeal to the common sense of members of this house. It will be apparent that however much we may desire to have organizations that may seem all-embracing, the form of organization which is likely to be most effective is something

[Mr. Mackenzie King.]

which has to come into being as events help to determine the situation. When Mr. Churchill and the President met at Washington in December, 1941, and January, 1942, no one in any part of the British Commonwealth or in any of the united nations took exception to those two great leaders conferring together along with their military experts on the score that all other parts of the commonwealth or all the other united nations were not represented. The same was true when Mr. Churchill and the President met again in Washington in June of last year.

On one of those occasions, as hon. members will recall, Mr. Churchill visited Ottawa and was present at a meeting of the war committee of the cabinet at which he gave a statement to my colleagues and myself of the discussions which he and the President had had. I think I may recall also to the minds of hon. members that when the President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain first met at Washington I was invited by both to be present, and I was present at conferences that took place between them. I was not present at all the conferences, but I was kept very fully informed. Also at the time that the President and Mr. Churchill met in June, I was invited again to be present in Washington while they were there. I had many conversations with both of them individually and together in reference to the different matters they had been discussing.

I think I am at liberty to say now that, at the Washington conference in June, plans with respect to the invasion of North Africa were fully discussed. I had inside knowledge of those plans at that time. They were not carried out for some little time thereafter, but they were known to the military advisers of the governments of the united nations concerned, and later were made known to members of the war committee of our government in so far as it was desirable that they should be known.

In many of these matters of strategy there are obvious reasons why the information should be confined to military experts more particularly rather than made known generally to the civil authorities. I could mention other instances. Perhaps I am not disclosing a secret when I say that the President of the United States invited me just a month or two ago to visit him in Washington. I spent two days and a half with him as his guest at the White House. We were practically alone in our discussions in the White House at the time, and on that occasion I received from the President the fullest measure of his confidence with regard to matters pertaining to