

consensus -- otherwise, in all likelihood, an emergency meeting would never be called. As a compromise, Canada proposed a "screening mechanism" that would oblige any state requesting an emergency meeting to explain in detail why such a meeting was necessary. It also proposed that the emergency procedure be established on a trial basis by the Berlin Council meeting, with the decision regarding permanent establishment being postponed to the Helsinki FUM. The EC also proposed a screening mechanism, which would require the provision of information within 48 hours and a two to five day waiting period before the meeting took place.

### **High-Level Political Involvement: The Berlin Council**

The meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin on June 19-20, the first high-level meeting since the Paris Summit, would set important precedents for future meetings and go a long way towards determining the relevance of the Council and, by extension, the CSCE, to the post-Cold War problems of Europe. In the seven months since Paris, there had been a diminishment of interest in the CSCE on the part of the West, as NATO developed the idea of outreach and the EC cautiously explored similar possibilities; there had also been a retrenchment on the part of the USSR. The Central and East Europeans had lowered their initially over-ambitious hopes for the CSCE, but were still searching for a political/security framework to replace the vacuum in which they found themselves. In Canada's view, the CSCE continued to be the most logical vehicle for keeping the USSR constructively engaged in Europe and for securing the political and security interests of the new Eastern regimes. It was important that the first Council meeting demonstrate the CSCE's value by leading to tangible results. In Canada's view, these should include:

- designating the CPC as the Valletta nominating institution;
- broadening the CPC communications network;
- entrusting the CPC with elaborating procedures for fact-finding missions;
- naming the CPC as the forum for consultations to prepare the post-Helsinki arms control negotiating mandate;
- instructing the CSO and the CPC Consultative Committee to submit a report on the possibilities of assigning the CPC broader tasks related to dispute settlement; and
- arriving at a means of convening emergency CSO meetings.

The Berlin Council was broadly successful in meeting these objectives. Ministers decided that the CPC communications network would preferably be used for all communications in procedures in emergency situations, thus the CSCE Secretariat would be connected to it. They endorsed the report of the Valletta meeting and agreed to designate the CPC as the nominating institution for the CSCE dispute settlement mechanism. They requested their representatives to the CPC Consultative Committee to start informal consultations aimed at establishing new post-Helsinki negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all CSCE participating states. In addition, Ministers requested the CSO to prepare recommendations on the further development of CSCE institutions and structures, with the understanding that the Consultative Committee would contribute sections concerning the enhancement of the role of the CPC.

The Council also settled on a procedure for convening emergency CSO meetings: any state could request that such a meeting of the CSO be held, after first seeking