

- 1) illicit traffic of small arms is much harder to track;
- 2) small arms are easier to steal;
- 3) transactions involving the transfer of small arms are frequently at the sub-national level, thereby avoiding governmental controls;
- 4) "there is no phenomenon in international trade in major weapons that can be compared to the leaking, rupturing and continuing pipeline of small arms" (p. 6).

Part III includes a global profile of the characteristics of the trade in small arms. Rana notes that the vast majority of conflicts in the 1990s have been intra-state, ranging from random incidence of criminality to full blown insurgency. She includes a survey of the general trends evident in these conflicts (e.g., ethnic hostility has increasingly erupted into violence).

Part IV is an analysis of the links between small arms and conflicts. The availability of small arms has increased as an "unintended fallout of recent progress in three of the most welcome political trends in the post-Cold War world" (p. 12). First, disarmament has forced manufacturers to promote exports as a means to retain employees. Second, demilitarization of several former military governments has caused former defense personnel to produce and sell small weapons. Finally, the conclusion of several intra-state conflicts has made surplus weapons available for purchase.

Rana emphasizes that the political fallout from the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts is larger than the actual military and operational value of the weapons. Small arms will continue to be a problem, most notably in weak states where the government does not have a monopoly over the use of coercion to uphold the rule of law. She concludes that the measures used to control the proliferation of major conventional weapons will not work for small arms. There have been some precedents however, which will help (e.g., mandates given the United Nations for involvement in intra-state conflicts). She suggests three options to work towards regulating the spread of small arms:

- 1) the creation of an international workshop under the aegis of UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) and the Commission on Global Governance;
- 2) the formation of an interregional working group with participants from regional groups such as the OAS (Organization of American States);
- 3) the convening of a high level panel of governmental experts to study the issue.

Annex I details the characteristics of small arms. Annex II lists the companies that manufacture small arms. Annex III reports the countries that manufacture small arms. Annex IV chronicles the armed conflicts in the world between 1989 and 1993.

533. Singh, Jasjit. "Controlling the Spread." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 152-160.

The need to control the spread of small arms and light weapons is obvious, but progress towards achieving that goal will be difficult. In contrast to analyses which emphasize the trade, Singh argues that studies must be done on the link between small arms and armed conflicts, the motives and incentives of suppliers and recipients, and the roots of conflict. To date, few such attempts have been made.

The first step must be the creation of a definition of small arms and light weapons. A major obstacle to the eventual elimination of small arms is their use as standard equipment by police and para-police forces. Another barrier is the firm belief in many countries of the right to bear arms. States must secure firmer control over the instruments of violence, and the links between drug trafficking and light weapons must be examined more fully if progress is to be made.

Singh lists steps to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons:

- 1) enhance public perception of the dangers of light weapons proliferation;
- 2) formulate a standard definition;
- 3) increase transparency in production and supply;
- 4) tighten national regulations;
- 5) apply the same stringent export controls in place for major weapons systems and dual-use technologies to light weapons;
- 6) curb the black market trade;