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special attention should be maintained on the question of security in our region throughout the negotiations. Therefore, to assure success of the convention, in a broad and general scope, the following needs to be realized.

The continuation of a "no war, no peace" situation breeds tension in the region and keeps hostilities at the threshold of danger. In such an atmosphere countries with capabilities will find it very difficult to give away the CW option. Diplomatic efforts should therefore be mobilized to bring resolution 598 to the stage of immediate implementation.

Once the conflict ends, the two sides, as well as the other countries in the region, will be in a position to engage in a constructive dialogue, not as immediate or potential enemies or supporters of this or the other side, but as neighbours with common objectives and goals. The task can take the form of intensive and informal discussions, at first, to bring into the open the threat perceptions of each country - much like the current CSCE exercise in Vienna.

This may be followed by formal collective security arrangements in the region, including measures to prevent war and for reduction of arms as well as eradication of chemical weapons, on the understanding that the latter is an independent, more urgent issue.

The convention must be as foolproof and as intrusive as possible. We cannot risk our security and give up the CW option now in exchange for a weak convention at the end. In the past, the mistrust between the major producing countries was a prelude to a more concrete and detailed approach. At the same time the prospects for early realization of the convention were dim. Now, with changes in relations, issues may be simplified. The chances for an early convention can therefore be much higher now. But we should avoid over-simplification which may compromise the intrusive and binding character of the convention.

A high degree of automaticity must be maintained in the convention. Iran has been a victim of chemical weapons as well as political selectivity. We cannot therefore leave our security at the mercy of political decisions. Automaticity should include: firstly, a mechanism that ensures the availability of all relevant information, including information on possible violations, to all member States without any political prejudice; secondly, the concretization of routine and challenge inspections and inspections in the event of alleged use in a manner not hampered by political decisions; thirdly, provisions for sanctions and other punitive measures based directly on technical reports and not political decisions in cases of violations, and particularly in cases of use; and fourthly, a level of automatic assistance to the victims of use or the threat of use.

The element of timing and the order of destruction is also significant. We believe the 10-year period is too long and can make many things unpredictable. With political will, technical problems may be surmounted to reduce this time span. Moreover, the order of destruction should be formulated not just on a quantitative but also on a qualitative basis. This, for us, has tremendous security implications and we need to be quite watchful of it.