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"exit from it. *And I say now, that on the whole frontier of the State of New-York, with the single exception of the Narrows below the city, there is not a point of equal importance.* I hope this Government will last forever; but if it does not, and if in the judgment of Heaven, so great a calamity shall befall us as the rupture of the Union, and the State of New-York shall ther by be thrown upon her own defences, I ask, is there a single point, except the Narrows, the possession of which she will so much desire? No there is not one. *And how did we obtain this advantage for her?* The parallel of 45° north was established by the treaty of 1783 as our boundary with Canada in that part of the line. *But as I have stated, that line was found to run south of Rouse's Point.* And how did we get back this precious possession? By running a semicircle ikethat of the King of Netherlands? No; we went back to the old line, which had always been supposed to be the true line, and the establishment of which gave us not only Rouse's Point, but a strip of land containing some thirty or forty thousand acres between the parallel of 45° and the old line.

"*And here let me say, once for all, that, if we had gone to arbitration we should inevitably have lost what the treaty gave to Vermont and New York; because a'l that was clear matter of cession and not adjustment of doubtful boundary.*"

These, Mr. Speaker, are sad and weighty words for us. I say, therefore, that the surrender of this point has made the defence of Canada infinitely more difficult and costly. It entails the erection on our part of extensive works to defend Montreal, between the St. Lawrence and Champlain, the cost of which Colonel Jervis estimates at half a million sterling, and which works will take many thousand troops to man. If the fortress since erected by the Americans on the position of Rouse's Point had been ours, it alone would have closed up that avenue of approach to the heart of Canada. [Hear, hear.] In these facts we have a strong claim on the Imperial Government.

But there is another view of the case which practically presents itself to the minds of Canadians. If war takes place, it is almost

certain to spring from causes over which Canada has no control—from international disputes—to which we are not likely in any way to give rise. The history of the past is appealed to—the right of search led to the war of 1812—the possession of Ruatan, a barren island on the South American coast, nearly involved us in hostilities—the Enlistment Question during the Russian war—the Boundary Question in Oregon—the transactions at St. Juan—the Trent affair—the equipment of the Alabama and Florida—are all Imperial questions. [Hear, hear.] The St. Albans raid and other kindred aggressions would never have taken place, but with the hope of embroiling England in the American war. [Hear, hear.] But, Sir, when our people consider that aspect of the case, we must not be insensible to the other, and the *advantageous* one to us. We must not forget that the invasion of our soil means war with England;—that the English flag protects our commerce in every quarter of the globe. The English name protects our citizens wherever they are—we enjoy the countless and inappreciable blessings of being British subjects—and we must be ready to make those sacrifices—exceptional and trying though they may be—to preserve those blessings. [Cheers.] In identifying ourselves thus with the rest of the Empire, we may fairly ask England to pause before she adopts a policy which must lead to its dismemberment—so far at least as the Colonies are concerned. If Canada is left to herself—the whole of British North America follows. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. [Hear, hear.] The Imperial Government may save themselves the trouble of fortifying Quebec, or Halifax either. Every shilling of outlay is *useless*, and if these Colonies go, and are added to the power of the United States, as they would be—how long would Bermuda—or even the West Indies remain? How long would British Columbia, or Vancouver remain? England would be without a Port on the West shores of the Atlantic, or the East of the Pacific! [Hear, hear.] Talk of holding Quebec and Halifax, as if they were Gibraltar and Malta! Why, Sir, the thing is absurd! You can't hold Quebec or Halifax either, without you hold the Cities and the sur-