

the historic visit to Peking, was able finally to readjust Japan's own policy to the new realities.

But nowhere has the new alignment had such a traumatic impact as in North Vietnam. For, suddenly, Hanoi discovered in 1971 that its interests and those of its great Communist allies no longer coincided. It protested. Its leading journals published angry editorials. Its leaders spoke of continuing the conflict — if necessary with no outside help. But Hanoi knew that it no longer held a strong hand. It has been argued that the last Communist offensive in South Vietnam, launched in March 1972, was a major gamble to destroy the government of Saigon (or at least gain a good bargaining position in the talks ahead) before it was too late.

One may never know. But it can be surmised that the new attitudes in Peking and Moscow played a decisive role in Hanoi's decision to come to terms with the Americans — these new attitudes as well as the immense damage done by the U.S. bombing, the weariness of the people, the blockade of the ports, and the battle losses in the South. The bombs did not weaken the will of the leaders in Hanoi. Nor did they halt the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South. But one need only listen to the domestic broadcasts of Radio Hanoi to know that the country has been bombed half a century back.

The bitter experience of 1972 is likely to shape Hanoi's course in the future. It now knows exactly how far its two great allies will — or will not — go in supporting

he was in close touch with U.S. authorities. On November 20, Mr. Sharp discussed these matters with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in New York, and he held further conversations with Mr. Rogers during sessions of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in Brussels on December 7 and 8. Until the ceasefire negotiations were concluded, it was not possible to know the terms of reference, operating conditions, size, responsibilities, financing and facilities that the new commission would have.

Mr. Sharp emphasized in his statement of December 3 on the role being contemplated for the new commission that there was no question of maintaining peace through the use of arms. If it were decided to provide Canadian military personnel for the commission, they would not be a military formation but specially-selected individuals who had the required expertise to observe and report on implementation of the ceasefire agreement. They would be part of mixed observer groups drawn from each of the four participating nations — Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. Elaborating on the points on which Canada sought clarification, Mr. Sharp said during a press conference on November 21 that it would not be possible to have a successful supervisory force unless you have some international authority to which to report; you cannot have a successful one that doesn't have clear rules for reporting, because

these are the kinds of ambiguities that have interfered with the successful operations of these kinds of commissions in the past . . .”.

In an interview on the CTV television network on November 25, Mr. Sharp said Canada would insist that the protocol establishing the conditions under which the commission would work be signed by all four belligerents.

He said Canada's purpose for participation in any new supervisory machinery despite the conspicuous lack of success of the old ICC would be to help bring the war to an end. "It's the only condition under which we would participate. We have no other interest . . .". Mr. Sharp said in the interview it would be unrealistic to think that the conflict in Vietnam would be over at the time a ceasefire was signed and a supervisory commission appointed. But membership in a supervisory commission should be considered very seriously if there was a chance that a mutually representative group of observers might reduce the scale of violence significantly and permit some sort of political settlement.

Mr. Sharp said on both November 21 and 25 that the cost of participation in a supervisory commission would be very substantial — in the tens of millions of dollars. But to contribute to world peace by stopping the bloodshed in Vietnam would — in the view of the Government and the Canadian people — be worth such a price, he declared.