

pledge now." But while stressing the political and moral aspects of General MacArthur's return to the Philippines, the President also underlined its real significance in the war against Japan. "Leyte is only a way station on the road to Japan. It is 700 miles from Formosa, 850 miles from China. We are astride the lifeline of the war-lords' empire; we are severing that lifeline. . . . We shall strangle the black dragon of Japanese militarism for ever." Liberal papers express their pleasure at the immense scale of this operation, which they declare explodes the Republican argument that President Roosevelt was holding up material support for General MacArthur. On the whole the press has been cautiously optimistic about the invasion of the Philippines. It is realised that the second and more serious phase of the Pacific war has yet to start, and that this will call for devotion and sacrifice by those taking part.

As the election day draws nearer the tempo of controversy is noticeably increasing, and the political atmosphere, always warmer than in Britain, is becoming supercharged. All observers are agreed that, at present, the results cannot be regarded as a foregone conclusion for either candidate. Despite the fact that the President said he would not "campaign in the usual sense," it is now understood that he has been persuaded to make public appearances at Philadelphia, Boston and possibly Chicago and other places. Governor Dewey continues relentlessly to attack the Administration on all fronts, personal, domestic and foreign. At Pittsburgh he continued to hammer home his accusation that the Administration was quarrelsome, wasteful and worn-out. Belabouring the doctrine of the "indispensable man," Mr. Dewey maintained that the American people everywhere, from coast to coast, were coming to the decision that it was time for a change.

In an address before the *New York Herald Tribune* Forum Mr. Dewey accused the President of personal secret diplomacy and quoted, as one illustration of this, the surrender terms to Roumania, which disposed of Bessarabia and Transylvania and dealt with economic matters. The treaty was signed by a representative of Soviet Russia acting on behalf of the United States and, he alleged, without the knowledge of Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. (This has since been formally denied by Mr. Hull.) He appealed to the Italian, Polish, German, Balkan and pro-French vote by maintaining that the President, by his personal intervention, had introduced chaos, confusion and disaster into America's foreign policy.

Clearly distinguishing between Mr. Cordell Hull and the President, Mr. Dewey admitted, however, that "a good start" had been made at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, since this vital problem had been left to the State Department, "where it rightly belongs." The task of building a world organisation for peace, Governor Dewey emphasised, must not wait for victory but should go forward immediately. "We must make sure that our participation in this world organisation is not subject to reservations that would nullify the power of that organisation to maintain peace and halt future aggression." Mr. Dewey, however, did not comment himself on the means of avoiding nullifying reservations. The Republican press has hailed this speech as conclusive evidence of Mr. Dewey's "true internationalism," and the *Chicago Tribune* deplored the fact that he had committed himself so far.

President Roosevelt on the 21st October toured New York City in an open car for several hours, despite the strong wind and heavy rain. Later that evening, looking buoyant and full of vigour, Mr. Roosevelt delivered a forthright major address to the Foreign Policy Association. Earlier there had been much rumour that the President had not taken part in the Moscow conference because of ill-health. After Saturday's strenuous performance this has subsided. In his speech the President called for the completion of a United Nations organisation "without delay and before hostilities actually ceased," and like Mr. Dewey (whom, however, he did not mention by name) he deprecated carping criticisms on detailed points of procedure. "When the first world war was ended I believed—I believe now—that enduring peace in the world has not a chance," asserted Mr. Roosevelt, "unless this nation is willing to co-operate in winning it, and maintaining it. I thought then—I know now—that we have to back our words with deeds. Peace, like war, can succeed only where there is a will to enforce it, and where there is available power to enforce it. The council of the United Nations must have the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if necessary. It is clear that, if the world organisation is to have any reality at all, our representative must be endowed in advance, by the people themselves, by constitutional means through their representatives in the Congress, with authority to act." The President also indicated with pride the part his

Administration had taken in formulating the Good Neighbour policy and his action in recognising Soviet Russia in 1933. (Incidentally, in an earlier press conference, the President expressed the view that the new world security organisation should not meet in any one city but that it should assemble in different places at different times, following the system developed by the Pan-American organisation.) The President vigorously denied that he had made any secret commitments in the sphere of foreign affairs and warned his hearers that, if the Republicans won control of Congress, "then inveterate isolationists would occupy positions of commanding influence and power."

While Republican papers underlined Mr. Dewey's charge that the President was "handling foreign affairs on the basis of personal secret diplomacy," Democrats, Liberals and middle-of-the-road papers saw in Mr. Dewey's speech serious misrepresentations of the facts. Mr. Walter Lippman, while agreeing that Mr. Dewey's speech was impressive evidence of the progress the United States had made towards national agreement on foreign policy, nevertheless declared "there are items in the critical section of the speech which are not competent, efficient, or even scrupulous" and he declared that this proved that Mr. Dewey "could not be trusted now with responsibility in foreign affairs." Pointing out that the remarks on Roumania "were recklessly inaccurate," he contrasted them with the statesmanlike conduct of Mr. Roosevelt, who had played "a leading part in forming and holding together the greatest military coalition in the history of the world."

Revealing that he had spent an hour with Mr. Roosevelt discussing the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and other points of foreign policy, Senator Ball (see *Summary* No. 261) has announced that he will work and vote for the re-election of President Roosevelt although he does not intend to resign from the Republican party. Mr. Dewey is, in his opinion, so straddling the fence between isolationism and internationalism that he cannot be trusted to lead the nation at this time. An ex-Governor Cox of Ohio, the defeated Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1920, has pointed out that President Harding too had offered lip-service to the League of Nations and that the same people who supported Mr. Harding are now supporting Mr. Dewey and were opposed to Mr. Willkie.

The recognition of the de Gaulle Government has met with unrestrained approval in all quarters and there is particular pleasure that the Allies have acted in concert over it. Republican papers naturally maintain that recognition should have been given much earlier and could have been, had it not been for personal antipathy between General de Gaulle and President Roosevelt.

[See also under "France" and "Latin America."]

LATIN AMERICA.

A decree published in Buenos Aires on the 18th October prohibited direct or indirect propaganda in favour of countries with which Argentina has broken off diplomatic relations, and ordered the immediate closure of the *Mattino d'Italia*, the *Deutsche La Plata Zeitung*, and any other foreign periodicals of the same nature. A preamble stated that the Government was determined to enforce the logical consequences of its rupture with Germany and Japan, and could not admit the existence of papers which made propaganda for those countries. It added that other papers, "though without the preconceived purpose of serving foreign interests," occasionally played a similar part; and this "frequently exaggerated fact" served as a pretext for misrepresenting the country's international position: although no international agreement obliged the Argentine Government to restrict journalists in writing about the war, the present action was necessary to ensure a correct interpretation of Argentina's foreign policy.

Next day, at his weekly talk to newspapermen, Colonel Perón announced that "all military chiefs and officers of the armed forces," with certain (unspecified) exceptions, would leave Government offices they were holding without further delay. Colonel Perón remarked that only those considered strictly necessary would continue to hold administrative positions: army chiefs would thus "give public opinion one more proof of disinterestedness and wisdom."

Action will, of course, speak louder than words. A complete *volte-face* is hardly to be expected, but it is plain that the return to barracks (or cafés) of the large number of soldiers who have been acting as civil servants would give quite a new aspect to the régime. The value of the propaganda decree will depend upon its interpretation in the cases of the pro-Axis *Federal* and *Cabildo*. The more