

975.

DEA/9100-X-40

*Le haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in United Kingdom
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 686

London, March 21, 1951

RESTRICTED

Following from McKinnon to Abbott, Begins: Further re your No. 384 of March 1st. After numerous meetings our negotiations with Cuba have broken down. We have refused to consider an allocated quota as involving difficulties government would find almost insuperable. They will proceed to basis of unallocated but refuse if same is restricted to global amount authorized in yours under reference. It is obvious that their tactic is to inflate global to point where Cuban share even though unallocated would be about your present global figure. Our unwillingness to recommend enlargement of latter is due to our considered opinion that anything in nature of appreciable tariff concessions would not, repeat not, be forthcoming in any event. Cuban delegation has now notified officially further withdrawals under Article 28 comprising major portion of Geneva schedule. This situation will not be cleared up by yielding to Cuban blackmail at this (point?) and delegation's position will not change unless we receive specific instructions to the contrary. Ends.

976.

DEA/9100-X-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM 9

Ottawa, March 24, 1951

RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

Following for McKinnon, GATT Delegation, from Abbott. Reference your No. 686, March 21, 1951, negotiations with Cuba. Begins: Both Mr. Howe and myself are very disturbed over the threatened breakdown in the negotiations with Cuba and over the prospect that the outcome of the Torquay discussions will be followed by a worsening of the trading position of the Maritime provinces in particular, in the Cuban market. You should therefore urgently endeavour to prevent this from happening. As you know the Maritime provinces have never been happy over the B.W.I. agreement and this dissatisfaction would be greatly reinforced if our Commonwealth sugar preference policy would now lead to a further deterioration in alternative markets. It is possible that such increased dissatisfaction, having in mind the recent further reduction for fish outlets in the