The Address-Mr. Trudeau

strike to a conventional attack role. Also by 1972 the Bomarc ground-to-air missiles based in Canada had been returned to the United States. We subsequently decided to replace the nuclear-equipped Genie Canada-based CF-101s with state-ofthe-art CF-18 interceptors. These CF-18s will carry out our air defence role more effectively with conventional armaments than the CF-101 could do with nuclear weaponry. This means that later this year we shall have rid ourselves of the last vestiges of nuclear weapons.

We have done more than look to our defences, Mr. Speaker. We have addressed the causes of insecurity and instability, particularly in the Third World. East-West and North-South are the four points of the political compass of our modern age. The problems of the South cannot be solved in the absence of progress on global security. Massive military expenditures are distorting economic policies and diverting resources away from global economic development. This in turn is worsening Third World instabilities that ensnare East and West and add to the insecurity of us all. Canadians, therefore, have earned the right to speak. They are telling us, the Members of this House, as people everywhere are telling their own leaders, that the danger is too near. They want their leaders to act, to accept their political responsibility, to work to reduce the nuclear threat.

Last fall I spoke of an ominous rhythm of crisis. I drew attention to the confluence of three potentially disastrous trends: the resort to force to settle disputes; the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the worsening state of East-West relations. I decided to practise what all seven leaders of the industrialized democracies had proclaimed last summer at Williamsburg: "... to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war". I decided to use Canada's influence to call international attention to the danger, to try to inject high-level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend line of crisis, to work at the crossroads of common interest between the two sides.

• (1115)

I proposed that the megaphones be put away, that an armistice be declared in the war of ideology and recrimination, that an end be made to manichaeism on both sides, that we exercise leadership and apply statecraft in East-West relations wich is the most important strategic relationship that we have.

Since last fall I have taken that message to Paris, The Hague, Brussels and Rome; to the Vatican, to Bonn, to London and to Zurich. I presented it in Tokyo and Dacca and to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi; to Peking, to Washington and to the United Nations. I met with leaders in Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest, to ensure that our message was heard in the highest councils of the Warsaw Pact.

At each step along the way my message was straightforward. Canada was not looking for a seat at the superpower table. But our lives and our future were on that table, as were those of nine-tenths of the world's population living outside the United States and the Soviet Union. We all had a right and a responsibility to involve ourselves, to press those at the table to remember their own humanity.

We proposed giving political impetus to the Stockholm Conference on measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of war in Europe. As many other East-West contacts collapsed, that conference took on importance even beyond its status as the only forum serving the Helsinki process of detente.

We insisted that both sides invest political efforts to stimulate the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions. These MBFR talks are the key to achieving parity of conventional forces in central Europe and to raising the nuclear threshold, thereby diminishing reliance on early first use of nuclear weapons.

If I may make an aside, I want to insist that the MBFR talks are concerned with force reductions. They are not seeking equilibrium at a higher level; they are seeking equilibrium at a lower level. I have explained it many times so I cannot understand for the life of me why raising the nuclear threshold by balancing conventional forces is always interpreted by my critics as balancing at a higher level. Surely the purpose of MBFR reductions is to seek a balance at a lower level and therefore to raise the nuclear threshold that way.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Trudeau: We also proposed meetings as soon as possible of the five nuclear powers so that a forum might be established wherein to negotiate global limits and, eventually, reductions to their nuclear arsenals.

We urged action to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is in the interest of superpower, middle-power and micro-state alike. Yet as long as the five nuclear powers show little sign of initiating the reductions called for in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we run the grave risk of seeing nuclear weapons spread to new regions and old rivalries.

Above all, at each step along the way I have urged political leaders to commit themselves personally; to put peace at the top of their agenda; to exercise the political leadership that the current dangerous situation demanded; to restart the dialogue between East and West. I told President Reagan that the signals he was sending of American strength were being received in the East but that a message of peace was not getting through. I told leaders of Eastern Europe that the harsh rhetoric of their declarations had guaranteed rejection of the Warsaw Pact's more positive proposals, and there were some. Misperception and mistrust on both sides run deep but I believe we are beginning to see the signs of progress.

In Goa in November, 42 Commonwealth leaders strongly endorsed our efforts to restore political East-West dialogue and to promote negotiations among the nuclear weapons states.

In Brussels in December, NATO foreign ministers reached a consensus on several points I had argued strenuously during the past few years, particularly in a few NATO summits that