

*The Address—Mr. Pearson*

other proposition, which is the complete integration of the forces of NATO under a NATO command. Here it seems to me that the attitude of the French government, though it is of course perfectly sincere, gives ground for anxiety. But before we go overboard in condemning France—and I am glad that the minister has acted with wise discretion in anything he has said on this matter—we should remember that there are other members of the NATO coalition—the United States and the United Kingdom, and perhaps others—who are just as reluctant as France to accept the full defence and foreign policy implications of the NATO pact; that is, full integration militarily and much closer political and economic consultation and co-operation that we now have. The head of the French government, who has done so much for France and, therefore, for western civilization and western security, has been reported as saying—and I quote from the report—that it is inconceivable that the time should come when France would not be in command of her own forces, and that the French government could not surrender to a military commander over whom it did not have control the right to open fire over France.

If the other members of the coalition take that position, that will be the end of NATO as we know it. Therefore we should do everything we can to persuade the French to modify that position, and one of the best ways of doing that is to exercise influence in the direction I have just mentioned. The fact is that if NATO is to survive it must move further away from, rather than back to, the concept of an old-fashioned military alliance based on co-operation alone and also on exclusive sovereign control over every aspect of such co-operation. If we cannot do this—and I know something about the difficulties in the way—and if we cannot develop closer and more unified collective control rather than less—and this means far more than a North American continentalism under United States domination—then the Atlantic alliance will eventually disappear as a genuine collective system based on political and economic, as well as military, unity. I know that is something, which every member in this house wants to do his best to avoid.

We shall have an opportunity shortly, I hope, to debate fully in this house these questions of defence and foreign policy, because the two really hang together and it is hard to discuss one without the other. I hope therefore that defence, especially, will be given early and full consideration by this parliament. There are questions of vital importance to our very existence to which the nation demands an answer, yet the government ignores these questions and meets the anxiety

of the people with meaningless clichés. I intend to ask some of these questions, and perhaps the Prime Minister will deal with them when he speaks. These are specific questions, and there are many others which could be asked. These are specific questions on defence policy.

Is there any defence policy that takes into account the situation of today, which is so basically different, as Mr. Khrushchev pointed out in Moscow last week, from the situation which existed only three years ago? Are we content in the face of this new strategic situation merely to be an appendage of the United States, tied to its continental and, indeed, its global strategy which is increasingly coming under criticism even in its own country? Are we, for instance, to spend millions maintaining out of date aircraft—worthy aircraft, as the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) called them the other day, and indeed they are that—or are we to replace them at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars by new United States aircraft, having sunk without trace the aircraft designed and built in Canada for the purpose? Are we to spend millions on missiles and then watch the United States abandon them? Should we accept without further investigation the new role of the R.C.A.F. division in Europe from high level interception to strike reconnaissance or strike attack while United States planes are carrying nuclear weapons which can be used only on instructions from United States commanders, because that is United States law? Does the Minister of National Defence still believe that you cannot use defensive tactical nuclear weapons without starting a chain reaction leading to a nuclear holocaust? What is the status of the agreement negotiated with the United States to cover nuclear weapons? We hear much about this now in the press, but on March 10 last, as reported on page 1775 of *Hansard*, the Prime Minister said that his government did not anticipate concluding any such formal agreement in the immediate future. What is the position now, because nothing could be much more important at this time than an agreement of this kind which deals with nuclear weapons and I take it, the political conditions governing the use of nuclear weapons?

Another question: Has the time not come to examine from the very foundation our whole defence policy through a small committee in order to find out where we should be going and how we can best get there, and to work it out if we can on a non-partisan basis so as to do everything we can to make defence policy national defence policy? It may not be possible to do that.