

as a whole. Nor could the U.N. take on any new role for security in and against the Gaza strip if Israel insisted on remaining there in spite of the Armistice Agreement and of repeated U.N. Assembly decisions that she should withdraw. Yet the key issue in this area, from the Israeli standpoint, is security against any resumption of incursions or raids into Israel from Gaza territory.

From the U.N. standpoint, this is also the key issue; how to provide security on both sides after Israeli withdrawal, on the basis of the Assembly's resolution of November 2, 1956, and of later resolutions, as well as of the reports of the Secretary-General.

Continued occupation of the Gaza strip by Israeli armed forces or by Israeli police and civilian administration after the withdrawal of her troops, and in the face of bitter Egyptian hostility, cannot in my view, give the security sought, for the following reasons:

(a) The prolongation of Israeli occupation of non-Israeli territory in the face of Assembly decisions to the contrary, and in violation of the Armistice Agreement will only incite new provocations, perhaps of greater magnitude than any hitherto. The emotions aroused would be almost certain to increase the likelihood of a resumption of incursions and raids from outside the strip, even though the protection afforded against them might be increased within the strip.

(b) Israeli occupation of Gaza would only shift a little to the southwest the line between Israel and Egypt across which the raids might come. Since there will always be a line or frontier between Egypt and Israel, the only sure way to stop the raids across the Egyptian Israeli border, wherever it may be, is by political action based on the sincere will of the Governments of Egypt and Israel, with U.N. assistance and supervision, to end such raids and incursions and to abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Assurance of this intention, given by the Government of Egypt, has been repeated by the Secretary-General in his last two reports. It seems obvious that continuing Israeli occupation of non-Israeli territory beyond the armistice line will nullify that assurance. It seems equally obvious that such assurances without any intervention by the U.N. to facilitate and ensure their actual fulfilment are not likely to satisfy the Israeli Government. The problem is, therefore, two-fold, and requires for its solution Egyptian and Israeli and U.N. action.

What, then, should be the nature of this action? First in priority and essential to all other steps, Israel should withdraw from the Gaza strip. This action would be in accordance with the previous decisions of the Assembly, and implicit in a