

up for a long time before we reach the goal of security and peace?

There are some who worry that the pace in terms of military preparation, in the face of the menace against us, will be too slow. There are others who argue that the pace from the beginning has been too fast; that re-armament has gone forward too rapidly; that we have tried to do too much too soon. They blame this on the fact that the military are now firmly in control of NATO, especially the military of the Pentagon. Military commanders and chiefs of staff naturally ask for the maximum forces they feel are required for defence. They would, I suppose, be failing in their duty and unfaithful to the military tradition if they ever openly admitted that they had enough to make peace secure or victory certain. It is the duty of governments, however, to reconcile military with economic and political factors. The North Atlantic alliance is an alliance of democratic peoples and in the last analysis it is the peoples who will decide what burdens they can bear. I can assure you, however, that the military leaders, who do not control NATO, are themselves by no means blind to the economic and social problems involved in re-armament. In this connection, may I quote again from General Eisenhower's report, a great state paper, full not only of military but of political wisdom. "Military strength", says General Eisenhower, "is of little worth unless backed by healthy expanding economies." And again speaking of the problem of the build-up:

"Everywhere we turned, we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear: nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale - the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate."

At the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council, for the first time, a procedure was found to assess NATO military plans in relation to the economic and political capacities of member nations. A special committee of the Council headed by the so-called "Three Wise Men" was appointed for this task. It reported at the Lisbon meeting in February last, and its report, except in some relatively minor details, was accepted by all governments. This kind of review will now be standard practice in NATO. Henceforth we shall have annual surveys of requirements and capacities. In this procedure I think we have a safeguard that our military programmes will not out-run our collective economic capacities.

We are now embarking on another and important stage in the development of NATO, the proposal to include the German Republic in the Western defence system, and, I hope, to include her also in the developing Atlantic Community. Admittedly, the proposal involves grave risks. It was not put forward in any light-hearted manner, but only after a full and indeed anxious examination of all the possible alternatives. Germany has written some bloody chapters in the recent history of Europe. We cannot forget that. To make the problem more difficult, the German people themselves are now divided by the Iron Curtain and the demand for the union of all Germans will grow, not lessen, in intensity as Germany is given freedom and acquires power. But if the risks of including Germany in Western defence are great, the risks of leaving her out are even greater. In the military sense the first line of defence of Western Europe must be kept as far east of the Rhine as possible. The human and industrial resources of Western Germany make her strength of great importance. We dare not risk that strength falling into the Soviet orbit, as it might so easily do if Germany were left free, neutral and united. But if Western Germany must be defended, the German people must themselves participate in that defence. How, therefore, can this best be done with the least risk to peace?