

the Pacific and the 'Yellow Peril', so-called, was in everyone's mind.

It seemed, therefore, that the danger from the clauses of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was neither academic nor remote and in consequence the Government of Canada became very anxious and Mr. Meighen, the Prime Minister, at the Imperial Conference of 1921 in London, insisted on notice of abrogation being given. We felt, and made no secret of our view, that we could not afford to leave any doubt whatever as to where we would stand in any conflict which might come about between the United States and Japan.

The further outcome of this action in the Washington Naval Treaties, etc., may not have been entirely agreeable to some schools of thought in other sections of the Commonwealth, but for Canada it did bring a definite and general realization that in seeking the security of our homeland we needed to place a continuance of friendly relations with the United States in the first place.

As far as I can determine the transition from the negative conception of Canada and the United States as two nations whose interests were separated by a frontier, to a recognition of a need for positive association in defence was first expressed publicly in Mr. Roosevelt's Declaration in August 1938, when he said that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened", and Mr. King's reply that "we, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour and one of them is to see that, at our own insistence, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory". As the Prime Minister of Canada has said, these statements marked the first public recognition by both our countries of their reciprocity in defence based on mutual interest in one another's security.

This being the situation, when war broke out with Germany in 1939 there was no occasion for any anxiety as to the attitude of the United States and we could base our arrangements on the confident expectation that we would receive, as we did, every possible measure of help that was open to the U.S.A. to give, short of going to war.

Again in 1939, as in 1914, Canada went to war when the United Kingdom became involved in the European conflagration. In 1914, the British Declaration of war was sufficient to embrace all the Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire. In 1939 the situation was different. Our own Declaration of war was made of our own volition by Act of our own Parliament. While the procedure was different, the effect was the same and in each case, in a matter of weeks, a Division, together with other Units, was embarked for overseas to be followed by others in succession. In 1939, in addition to the Army, very large Naval and Air programmes were undertaken.

For the purpose of our discussion today, it is not necessary to trace the history of Canadian Forces overseas in detail. Until VE Day our Army was largely engaged in Europe, first in the U.K.; then in both the Western European and Mediterranean theatres; then concentrated in Western