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3.3.2 <u>The Participatory Status of an Outer Space Arms Control</u> <u>Agreement (Continued)</u>

political if not legal reasons. However, the multilateralization of an other space arms control accord is not in and of itself sufficient to mandate or justify the existence of a multilateral verification mechanism. It is to this question that the discussion now turns.

3.3.3

<u>Multilateral Participation in Treaty Administration and</u> <u>Verification</u>

Although it is plausible that the Superpowers may seek to multilateralize an outer space arms control agreement, it is by no means clear that such an agreement would thereby sanction a multilateral verification capability. Indeed, the only multilateral arms control treaty currently in force which contains provision for a specific multilateral organization designed to ensure compliance with treaty provisions is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Other multilateral agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty simply bind the parties to adhere to the terms of the agreement, and to verify compliance with the agreement through their own national resources. Questions of compliance are to be resolved on an ad hoc basis through consultation between the parties. There are no ongoing administrative mechanisms or verification assets at the disposal of the signatories as a group.

Therefore, the involvement of third parties in an arms control regime for outer space may require only that these states ensure that their national policies and programs conform to the provisions of the agreement, with verification of compliance consisting of the application of so-called National Technical Means (NTM's). In such a case, a legally sanctioned relationship between a multilateral verification capability such as Paxsat and a multilateral arms control regime would not exist. It must be asked, therefore, whether or not there exist incentives for the Superpowers and other states to sanction the inclusion ' of non-superpowers, and non-national verification assets in a compliance regime associated with an outer space arms control agreement.