

Similarly, CSBMs are defined as

measure[s] undertaken by states to promote confidence and security through military transparency, openness, constraints and cooperation. CSBMs are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and, as a rule, reciprocal.<sup>4</sup>

Other recent definitions of the term stress the same issues but reverse the emphasis so that the stricter definition is attributed to CBMs. Stedman and Rothchild, for example, define CBMs as,

limited, incremental, transparent, verifiable actions that demonstrate compliance with promises made through a treaty. Specifically, they involve information and communications measures to eliminate misperceptions about military action and constraining measures that aim to prevent military activities that may generate hostile perceptions.<sup>5</sup>

Certain terms stand out in these definitions which deserve further attention. For example, to the extent that CBMs expose vulnerabilities, they must be *reciprocal*. Knowing that both sides are equally vulnerable, parties are inclined *not* to take aggressive action because they can be certain that such actions can be reciprocated by their adversary. Alternatively, in not exploiting an adversary's vulnerabilities one sends a message of a willingness to cooperate. The longer one lives with mutual vulnerability, the more confidence one has in the benign intentions of one's neighbour.

In the strictest terms, confidence building also involves elements of *verifiability*. In an effort to maintain definitional and operational clarity, Stedman and Rothchild insist on considering only those measures which are verifiable as confidence-building measures. They do not consider rhetorical commitments to peace or declarations of peacefulness as CBMs, citing evidence that such pronouncements do little to instill confidence among adversaries.<sup>6</sup> Nor do they consider other measures such as power-sharing, decentralization and development as confidence building measures *per se* but *security*-building measures (to be discussed later). This is because these measures are not readily and definitively verifiable except until some undetermined point in future. Such a distinction is justified. Cooperation between adversaries is limited by the ability to recognize when an opponent is violating or complying with agreements.<sup>7</sup> Certainty or confidence that an opponent is committed

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<sup>4</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook, 1998* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1998), p. xx.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, "Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment," *International Peacekeeping* 3(2) (1996), p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> Stedman and Rothchild, p. 31. The authors cite Craig D. Parks, et al. "Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(1) (1996), pp. 134-51. In light of this research Stedman and Rothchild note that, "It is not enough to bring about a handshake between adversaries" – a fact which is borne out by recent experiences in Angola and Rwanda.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books, 1984), pp. 139-41.