

of tracking light weapons diffusion. Authoritative sources such as *Jane's Infantry Weapons*<sup>64</sup> lists only one Canadian manufacturer, yet this source is used by many in studies on light weapons diffusion. Several other sources consulted on light weapons manufacturers also failed to mention Canada as a producer. Admittedly, being licensed to produce or import/export does not indicate that it is actually occurring. The problem with much of the research on light weapons production is that it draws from sources that advertise production and, while these may indeed be the biggest "proliferators", it does not capture those that do not advertise, thus demonstrating another problem for the illicit tracking of light weapons.

Canada's firearms regulatory and enforcement system is by and large able to contain firearms smuggling to the point where there are not huge numbers of military type weapons entering the country unlike in many developing countries. Those weapons that do enter the country are by and large destined for organizations or individuals involved in criminal activities. The RCMP have a longstanding relationship with law enforcement agencies in the USA, particularly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and cooperates with INTERPOL in matters concerning firearms.<sup>65</sup> However, no state is entirely immune from political violence and if for some reason the political or social structure of the country proved incapable of responding to a serious situation, then the country could become ripe for an influx of arms. This situation is compounded due to Canada's long border with the USA. One only has to look at the UK which has very strong gun control legislation and in comparison to Canada a much smaller coastline and border, and the means to enforce compliance. Yet the UK finds it difficult in making significant dents in the number of weapons and explosives accumulated by the IRA.<sup>66</sup> The application of these observations is to demonstrate how formidable it might be for individual states and the international community to control or prevent light weapons fueling the demand of violent political conflict, particularly where there is money available to purchase arms illegally and the states seeking to prevent illicit arms transfers do not have sufficient resources to meet the challenge.

When it comes to illicit arms transfers whether in the tens, or the thousands, policy designed to constrain or reduce the availability of light weapons through controls on legitimate transfers will *ipso facto* enhance the attraction of the black market for both illicit suppliers and illicit users.<sup>67</sup> It is elementary economics that when demand exceeds supply

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<sup>64</sup> Gander, Terry J (ed). *Jane's Infantry Weapons: 1996-1997*. Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey.

<sup>65</sup> Canadian response to UN Survey, 14

<sup>66</sup> Smith, Christopher. "A Global Survey of Stocks and Flows of Light Weapons in the International System and a Case Study of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa." A paper delivered to the U.N. Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms. United Nations, New York, June 26, 1996, 8

<sup>67</sup> See. Aaron Karp. "The Rise of Black and Gray Markets." *The Annals of the American Academy*. 535 September 1994, 177. He coins the word "antipolicy" for this activity.