

only capable of going where its Members want it to go. If the UN "failed" to respond in an adequate and timely manner to the genocide in Rwanda, for example, it is because the Members of the Security Council decided not to intervene. In this sense, Security Council decision-making is a *process* whereby the Members try to reach a consensus on what action can be taken. The institution itself is conditioned entirely by the policy objectives of its Member States. Terrible mistakes such as the "safe havens" resolution for Bosnia indicate that the Security Council has experienced difficulty finding its way in the post-Cold War world. But the Council is starting to learn from these mistakes and recognizing that it has a collective responsibility to resist the impulse to pass ill-advised resolutions in response to media or domestic pressures.

Finally, more thought and policy development is needed on the challenge of *preventive diplomacy*. In cases where preventive measures prove to be unsuccessful, the Council should consider delegating authority to reimpose order to regional organizations and coalitions. Significant involvement of the OAS in Haiti (on elections assistance and human rights monitoring) has been helpful. In the absence of UN willingness to tackle the crisis in Burundi meaningfully, a regional response could prove effective (although it might also degenerate into the chaos that seems to plague ECOMOG, the ECOWAS peacekeeping force in Liberia). While it is worth exploring the regional model further, the UN should develop mechanisms to monitor and report more transparently on the impartiality of such missions. The UN also needs to plan in advance for the transition to other forms of involvement by the international community, notably peacebuilding. Such planning has been highly successful in Haiti. Where no governments volunteer to play lead roles in addressing crises, humanitarian and relief agencies will continue to do their courageous work. Their efforts deserve respect and support. Meanwhile, the major powers should patiently apply pressure on conflict protagonists to engage in peace negotiations. (e.g. in Sudan and Liberia)

Internal conflicts ideally amenable to UN mediation and confidence-building, as Guatemala may soon prove to be, are unlikely to proliferate in the years ahead. The norm will continue to be complicated, protracted cases of intra-state violence with few clear points of entry for the international community. The UN will, in some instances, need to move beyond the offer of good offices by the Secretary-General. At the moment, risk avoidance informs the outlook of the Security Council, particularly the P-5, as demonstrated most recently by the Council's strong reluctance to take action on escalating violence in Burundi. In this connection, it will be vital to persuade the US government to assume fully its responsibilities at the UN as the pre-eminent P-5 Member. Some have argued that the Secretary-General should take on a greater leadership and advocacy role with respect to the Security Council. (Others, notably the US, stress the Secretary-General's role as "the servant" of Member States.) While there may be an emerging consensus in the international community on the importance of human rights, democratic development, and even peacebuilding, as yet there seems to be no such international consensus on how the Security Council should act to promote these values and objectives in the years ahead. And there is significant apprehension that the Council will duck this key question.