

commitments because they believe, perhaps correctly, that the costs to themselves or their countries of not attacking will be even greater.

Leaders driven by need may devote much more time and energy, as did Sadat in 1973, to find strategies that design around defenders' commitments or military capabilities. They are also more likely to believe that their challenges will succeed. This motivated bias can lead to significant underestimation of an adversary's capability or resolve. The different locus of causation between opportunity and need driven challenges calls for an equivalent shift in the kinds of explanations that can account for deterrence success and failure. One of the important questions we want to examine in this connection is the extent to which factors like strategic and domestic needs, which appear to account for deterrence failure, are also present when deterrence succeeds. Our explanations of the causes of failure can only be tentative until they are validated against well-substantiated cases of deterrence success.

We also intend to examine deterrence in relation to other strategic interactions and strategies of conflict management. Our case studies indicate that one of the most critical determinants of deterrence, general and immediate, is the degree of desperation felt by a would-be challenger. Leaders are far more likely to resort to force if they believe that their strategic and political problems will become more acute in the future, that the military balance will deteriorate, and that there is little or no possibility of achieving their goals through diplomacy. Deterrence in these circumstances may only succeed in heightening the sense of desperation leaders feel, thereby making the use of force more attractive. Strategies of reassurance that seek simultaneously to reduce the pressures on leaders to use force and to create expectations of possible diplomatic gain may moderate adversarial behaviour. We propose to explore the interactive impact of reassurance and deterrence.

Another set of variables we propose to examine concerns the role perceptions of adversaries. Deterrence theory is premised on the objective determination of the roles of challenger and defender and