

## ARMS CONTROL DIGEST



### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

■ Some progress was made on strategic offensive arms reductions at the Washington summit in December. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their negotiators to complete work on a joint draft treaty "at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature" at the next summit in Moscow in May or June.

As discussed in Washington, the agreement would include the following:

- a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on no more than 1,600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers;
- a sub-ceiling of 4,900 ICBM and SLBM warheads (permitting up to 1,100 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs));
- a 50% cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs (the US has none), to 154 with 1,540 warheads;
- a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs, at 50% of the current Soviet level ("throw-weight" is the total weight that can be thrust over a given range by a ballistic missile. In general, Soviet ICBMs have been built with larger throw-weights than American ICBMs).
- a separate ceiling (outside the 6,000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), to be verified by such methods as "National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection"; and
- a range of verification measures, including continuous, on-site

monitoring of production and support facilities; various short-notice, on-site inspections; and a ban on the encryption of telemetry from missile flight-tests (a contentious issue in the SALT II treaty).

The two sides also agreed on so-called "counting rules," in which the parties agree for the purposes of the treaty on how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each different missile type.

The ninth round of negotiations began in Geneva on 14 January. A month later they were characterized as being "bogged down," with President Reagan's special adviser Edward Rowny accusing the Soviets of having "squandered four weeks of valuable time." Differences persisted on the following issues:

- ICBM warhead sub-limits: the US proposes a ceiling of 3,000 to 3,300; the Soviets prefer a "freedom-to-mix" as between ICBMs and SLBMs;
- SLCM limits and verification: the Soviets propose a ceiling of 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs, restricted to two types of submarine and one type of surface ship, plus an additional limit of 600 on conventionally-armed SLCMs. The US opposes any limits on the latter, and maintains that no adequate verification measures have yet been devised;
- ALCM counting rules: the US wants six ALCMs to be attributed to each ALCM bomber in the 6,000-warhead count, regardless of the number actually carried; the Soviets insist on counting the number "each type is equipped for";
- mobile missiles: the US wants a ban, but has indicated that it might drop this demand if the Soviets can offer an adequate verification scheme;
- ALCM range: the US wants ALCMs with a range of less than 1,500 kilometers to go unrestricted; the Soviets insist on the SALT II definition of a long-range ALCM as exceeding 600 kilometers in range;

- heavy ICBMs: the US wants a ban on production, flight testing, modernization and replacement; the Soviets are opposed;
- reductions period: the US wants the reductions to occur over seven years; the Soviets, five.

One of the key remaining tasks is the elaboration of detailed verification provisions. The US emphasizes that these will have to be much stricter than those of the INF Treaty, since numerical limits are more difficult to verify than an absolute ban (when detection of just one illicit weapon constitutes proof of violation). After meeting in Moscow from 21 to 23 February Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that their negotiators had been instructed to work out the key elements of the verification provisions in time for their next meeting 22 to 23 March in Washington.

Most observers agree, however, that the greatest stumbling block to completion of the Treaty is the continuing disagreement between the two powers on defence and space arms.

### Defence and Space Arms

■ As reported in the last *Peace&Security*, the Washington summit failed to resolve the issue of defence and space arms. After some initial confusion, it became clear that the Soviets had not changed their basic position making reductions in offensive weapons conditional on adherence (non-withdrawal) for a specified period to the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The two sides did agree at the Washington summit that "intensive discussions of strategic stability" would begin no later than three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period, "after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action."

On 15 January, apparently signalling abandonment of their draft treaty on defence and space arms

introduced last May, the Soviet delegation in Geneva tabled a draft protocol to the START Treaty which would commit the two sides to a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty "as signed in 1972." The US immediately rejected the proposal, tabling a draft treaty of its own a week later on "Certain Measures to Facilitate the Cooperative Transition to the Deployment of Future Strategic Ballistic Missile Defenses." Specific "predictability measures" contained in the draft include an annual exchange of data on each other's strategic defence programmes, visits to each other's laboratories, and observation of each other's tests. The US delegation was also, reportedly, instructed to seek Soviet acceptance of the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty sanctioning SDI testing in space.

In Washington on 29 January, senior Soviet official Georgi Kornienko charged the US with reneging on a Washington summit understanding to leave the "conceptual dispute" over SDI to be resolved at "some later time." He stated that it would be impossible to resolve the dispute over the meaning of the ABM Treaty before the Moscow summit, and repeated that the Soviets would never accept the Reagan Administration's "broad" interpretation of the Treaty. The Soviets have made it clear on numerous occasions that, in the words of US National Security Adviser Colin Powell, they reserve the "option to suspend implementation of negotiated reductions, and perhaps even begin increasing their strategic offensive forces, if the United States were to take actions which went beyond the Soviet Union's view of the obligations of the [ABM] Treaty."

### Arctic Zone of Peace

■ Canada provided its first formal response to Mikhail