

fic and technical resources than those already within our reach".

For the Belgian delegation, the extent of the scientific and technical work still essential to ensure adequate verification is not known. It believes that it is worth recalling that scientific and technical work may easily be compared to the progress of an alpinist when he sees a ridge; he may hope that it is the summit, but he knows that it may in fact only be a ridge which hides another. To enable these problems to be solved as rapidly as possible, the international scientific and technical community should devote itself to the task with determination.

In this connection, I should like to quote the following extracts from the report on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts during the week of 30 July to 3 August 1984 which was transmitted to me by the Belgian expert who drafted it:

"The documents were drafted at informal meetings of the experts concerned at the Australian Embassy. It should be stressed that the delegates of the socialist countries gave no assistance in the preparation of the working documents, although they attended the informal meetings of the Group. The Soviet experts reserved their comment until such time as they would have the translation into Russian ... Belgium will take part in the technical tests with the same number of seismological stations as the USSR!"

Belgium is a country of weak seismic activity, which is not the case of vast regions of the USSR, whose surface area is 750 times that of Belgium.

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At the current stage of the negotiations, three issues seem to my delegation to be the keys to progress. One is the declaration of locations of chemical-weapon stocks and chemical-weapon production facilities. A second is how to help ensure that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production. The third is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Today I shall discuss each of these pivotal issues in turn.

The United States has proposed that the locations of chemical-weapon stocks and of chemical-weapon production facilities be declared within 30 days after a State becomes a party to the convention. In itself such a declaration could contribute greatly to building confidence that States are prepared to reduce — and eventually eliminate — their reliance on chemical weapons. But declaration of locations is also an essential element of the verification measures designed to provide confidence that all stocks and facilities have been declared, as well as to provide confidence that the declared stocks and facilities are not misused before they are destroyed.

Let me elaborate. The completeness of declarations cannot be assessed unless a basis for such an assessment has first been established. With adequate information about existing stocks and facilities that have been declared, parties will be able to obtain adequate confidence that there are not stocks and facilities that have not been declared. Declared locations are essential to such an assessment and thus to building confidence in compliance. Once locations have been declared, then any stocks or facilities discovered at undeclared locations would clearly represent a violation of the convention. Furthermore, the systematic international verification measures needed to provide confidence during the period between declaration and destruction cannot be carried out unless such locations are declared. For example, it is obvious that international sealing of stocks or production facilities to prevent their illicit use would not be possible unless these locations are known to the technical secretariat.

We note, however, that the approach proposed by the Soviet Union is quite different. As my delegation understands it, no information on the locations of either stocks or facilities would be provided until just before their destruction. In the case of