

the period when they had a monopoly and can be forgiven for being worried that a future American administration might not be so cautious as the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.

I think the only conclusion one can draw from this is that the Soviet government will spend anything which is necessary to frustrate the Strategic Defense Initiative, especially by increasing its offensive strength by the deployment of very many more and very many new weapons, as the United States is also planning to do, whatever happens to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

We have precisely the very unstable situation facing us which President Reagan referred to in his speech in 1983, when he warned against the risk that there might be a long period in which both sides were increasing both their offensive and defensive weapons. Of course, this is the reason why the last three American Presidents of all parties have opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative and at least three of the last four American Defense Secretaries — Mel Laird, so far as I know, has not yet expressed a view, but that suggests he doesn't agree with the present administration and Bob MacNamara, Harold Brown and Jim Schlesinger have all very strongly opposed it.

Now, this is the situation we face. Let me try to offer some thoughts about how we cope with it. I think the first thing which I am forced to conclude is that, in the area of arms control negotiation, the most important thing is to stop the arms race by finding some means of halting the modernization of nuclear forces; in other words, to go for some sort of freeze on the testing and deployment of new systems, both offensive and defensive. This was a thought which Mr. Gorbachev expressed in his interesting interview with *Time Magazine* a month or so ago. I think the means of freezing the arms race are readily available. Practically every government which has looked at the problem of the modernization of the nuclear component in strategic forces agrees that you could do that through having a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. A good deal of work, I think, has been done by Canadian seismologists to suggest that you could reduce the size of a nuclear explosion which could be carried out without observation down to at least a kiloton, which is not much higher than you can produce through conventional weapons anyway.

Secondly, the means at the disposal of both the Soviet Union and the United States for photographing what is happening — both of them claim they can photograph car number plates from satellites