

Order of St. Michael and St. George, and Messrs. Thompson, Winter, and Bourne have been made Commanders in that order. It is understood that Mr. Chamberlain refused the distinction of knighthood; and he will probably live to capture higher game. The difference of treatment is not to be explained by the easily made statement that Republics are ungrateful; but because the Americans think themselves at liberty to play fast and loose with international questions for party purposes, invading in this way a region that other nations hold sacred. In such a line of conduct they will scarcely find their account when the profit and loss of the transaction are added up.

The English harvest is considerably damaged by rain, and the *London Daily News* estimates that it will be necessary to import three or four millions of quarters more wheat than ordinary. This would cost fifteen millions of dollars. Manitoba and the North-West will supply a part of the deficiency, the crop there being large beyond precedent. In that new country every year will add to the area sown; but the yield will, of course, as elsewhere, be more or less influenced by the nature of the seasons. But, one year with another, the total surplus available for export will show a continuous increase, and the difference will fill the gap likely to be caused by the diminished production of the exhausted lands of the United States.

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S RETALIATION.

The word retaliation does not properly convey the meaning of the hostile legislation directed and threatened against Canada by the United States. Retaliation is the avenging of an injury; but the assumption that Canada has inflicted injury upon the United States has no better warrant than is to be found in the fact that we have merely insisted on our treaty rights. As early as March last year an Act of Congress was passed, by which the President is empowered to refuse admittance of Canadian vessels and produce into the United States. This powerful weapon President Cleveland now asks Congress to supplement, by authorizing the withdrawal from Canada of the bonding privilege and the right to discriminate against us in canal tolls, at Sault Ste. Marie and on the St. Clair Flats, on the pretence that we discriminate against American vessels passing through the Welland Canal. We have before discussed this allegation and need not now repeat the argument.

In refusing to ratify the Fishery Treaty, the Republican majority of the Senate believed they had captured the Irish vote for their party in the Presidential election; and it occurred to President Cleveland to outbid them. The refusal to ratify the treaty and the President's retaliatory message together constitute the American instalment of the Irish question. Canada is scarcely in a position to complain of these tactics, since both political parties here have made the most of the Irish question by addressing the Imperial Government to

grant Home Rule. If it had been possible to go further, there is no reason to suppose that they would have stopped here. President Cleveland, if he should get the power for which he asks, may have to play the game out; and if that should happen, it will make no difference to us that the cause which moved him to action was political. Blaine has taken up the cudgels against the retaliation move of the President, and he will, if he can, block the game in the Senate. The strategy and counter-strategy of the two parties will have to be worked out. Canada can afford to look on with a considerable degree of composure. The Western States are decidedly opposed to a policy which would deprive them of the use of Canadian railways.

Should retaliation come, and it is not impossible, Canada would suffer a certain amount of injury, in common with the United States. Which would suffer most it would be idle to try to balance. The self-inflicted injury of the United States need not greatly concern us. The injury to ourselves we should have to learn to bear. Without pretending to estimate, much less to under-estimate it, we ought not to forget that there would be some compensations. The lesson of self-reliance which we should learn would be most valuable; probably worth all it would cost. We are now making much less use of the bonding privilege than formerly; from which fact it is fair to conclude that transit over our own country is often found to be no more costly than over American territory. This gives us some idea of the measure of the loss which the withdrawal of the bonding privilege would occasion. Still there would be a loss, a serious loss, but a loss which we on our part should know how to bear manfully. We should increase the facilities of transport through our own country; we should probably build two Hudson's Bay railways, one from Winnipeg and another from Toronto. We should increase the facilities for shipping over the Intercolonial. Some difficulty would be experienced in shipping the great harvest of Manitoba and the North-West; but difficulties of this kind would be surmounted in a short time. In the meantime, Canadians would be called upon to exercise the virtue of patience; to learn to endure without murmuring the evil inflicted upon us. It would not be good for us to learn lessons of exclusiveness; but the best stock we could take in would be a stock of self-reliance. What is intended for our discomfiture may prove to be for our good.

There would probably not be much use in arguing the matter with President Cleveland. But it is quite clear to us that the bonding privilege can be withdrawn, without a two years' notice, only by violating the express letter of the Treaty of Washington. We, too, hold in our hands means of retaliation not less extensive than those which the United States can command. Whether we ought to use them, and to what extent, need not now be decided, nor even discussed. It is sufficient to know that they are within our grasp. When the crisis comes, if it should come, the duty of Canada's statesmen will be to

do what is best for the country; and unless we mistake the signs of the times, there will be no difference of opinion as to what ought to be done. Any discordant note uttered fails to find an echo.

AN ASSESSMENT TRIO IN TROUBLE.

It is only the old story, and the inevitable result to all of them, sooner or later; but we will just mention those of the most recent which have failed to pay, not merely the "last man," but all remaining men on their books.

The United Order of Honor, of Indianapolis, was originally formed from the remains of the Independent Order of Workingmen, which commenced in 1875 and flourished widely for several years. During the past few months death claims have come in far beyond the ability of the members to pay, and on July 10th the Missouri jurisdiction refused to honor further assessments. The liabilities, in round numbers, are about \$60,000, involving an assessment of between \$12 and \$20 on each member. Nearly all the widows thus left in the lurch reside in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky.

In 1882 the New York Safety Reserve Fund was organized, and should have been safe enough, seeing that one-third of all dues from members was to have been faithfully set aside for the payment of claims when assessments became heavy. Steps are now being taken for its dissolution by the New York Insurance Department. Its liabilities have been found, on investigation, to be \$48,161, and its assets nearly nil. Last year it paid \$6,818 in death claims, and \$13,541 for expenses, and had a confiding membership at the close of 1887 numbering 4,382. How much insurance is there in a certificate issued by a society that has no assets, or not enough to meet even one year's claims, and that depends wholly upon the voluntary contributions of members who have themselves been deceived into becoming such?

The third and last "hat-passer" we shall mention at this time also hails from New York city, and is called the St. Lawrence Life Association. Between 1882 and 1886 it was apparently endued with a good deal of life, having had in the latter year 1,006 members, who contributed, during the twelve months, \$23,054, and distributed \$6,978 amongst the widows. But in 1887 no less than \$18,194 was needed for this purpose, and that is why the members paid, all through that dreary year, heavier assessments, which footed up a total of \$86,270, and reduced the faithful pocket contributors to 1,094. Now we come down to the close of May last, when the last assessment was responded to by only 47 members. Some 800 of them went over, or were transferred, to the Citizens' Mutual Life Insurance Association, which was, apparently, started for this purpose by a few of them in 1886, and on a similar basis. Its death losses have also been heavy and its early demise seems quite well assured. The liabilities of the St. Lawrence dissolver are now stated at \$88,000, to meet which there is only \$6,896